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The best way to predict the future is to invent it. –Alan Kay

INTRODUCTION
The web is the ultimate matchmaker, capitalizer, and
economizer. New digital technologies are turning everything
into an available resource: services, products, spaces, connections, and knowledge, all of which would otherwise be collecting
1. Alan C. Kay, Predicting the Future, 1 STAN. ENGINEERING 1, 1–6
(1989), http://www.ecotopia.com/webpress/futures.htm.
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2

dust. It’s been called “the sharing economy,” “the disaggregat3
4
ed economy,” “the peer-to-peer economy” (P-2-P), “the human5
6
to-human economy” (H-2-H), “the community marketplace,”
7
8
“the on-demand economy,” “the App economy,” “the access
9
10
11
economy,” “the mesh economy,” “the gig economy,” and also,
12
“the Uberization of everything.” Each of these terms represents an aspect of the digital platform revolution, but none
completely captures the entire scope of the paradigmatic shift
in the ways we produce, consume, work, finance, and learn. A
new wave of start-ups, relying on digital platform technology,
are connecting people and transforming behavior and relationships outside of the digital world, tapping into underutilized
human, social, and real capital. This new economy dramatically
extends the lifecycle of products, shortens time of use, and exponentially expands connectivity and access. These new business models are generating billions of dollars annually and
13
show overwhelming rates of growth. Most importantly, the
2. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/node/21573104.
3. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 917 (2015).
4. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2.
5. Tom Lowery, Human to Human (H2H) – Collaboration Is the New
Competition, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/tom-lowery/human-to-humancollaborati_b_4696790.html.
6. Carrie Melissa Jones, Uber, Mint, and Square Investor Rob Hayes
Shares What He Looks for in Community-Driven Startups, VENTURE BEAT
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.venturebeat.com/2015/03/14/uber-mint-and
-square-investor-rob-hayes-shares-what-he-looks-for-in-community-driven
-companies.
7. Kashmir Hill, Meet the Lawyer Taking on Uber and the Rest of the OnDemand Economy, FUSION (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.fusion.net/story/
118401/meet-the-lawyer-taking-on-uber-and-the-on-demand-economy.
8. Robinson Meyer, The App Economy Is Now ‘Bigger Than Hollywood,’
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/01/the-app-economy-is-now-bigger-than-hollywood/384842.
9. Steve Denning, Three Strategies for Managing the Economy of Access,
FORBES (May 2, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/05/02/
economic-game-change-from-ownership-to-access.
10. See LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING 15–19 (2010).
11. Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 3, at 925.
12. Sunny Freeman, ‘Uberization’ of Everything Is Happening, but Not
Every ‘Uber’ Will Succeed, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www
.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/01/uberization-uber-of-everything_n_6971752.html.
13. See generally The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: U.K., http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/
collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue
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platform economy is radically changing the traditional
equilibria of supply and demand, blurring the lines between
owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and contractors, and transcending the spatial divides of personal and
professional, business and home, market and leisure, friend
and client, acquaintance and stranger, public and private.
Companies are introducing that which was non-commodifiable
to the market—whether it is a ride share, a spare bedroom, a
spot on a waitlist, or a loan for a lawnmower. What has previously been relegated to the realm of personal property is shifting to the realm of access: instead of installing clunky rabbitear antennae, people pay to access thousands of tiny anten14
nas; instead of purchasing a bicycle, users pick up and drop off
15
bicycles at hubs all around the city; and instead of owning a
16
vacation home, hosts swap houses during the holidays.
Unsurprisingly, then, the platform economy defies conventional regulatory theory. Millions of people are becoming parttime entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models
and entrenched market interests, and challenging regulated
industries, all while turning ideas about consumption, work,
risk, and ownership on their head. Paradoxically, as the digital
platform economy becomes more established, we are also at an
all-time high in regulatory permitting, licensing, and protection. The battle over law in the platform is, therefore, both fundamentally conceptual and highly practical. New business
models such as Uber, Airbnb, and Aereo have received massive
amounts of support from venture capitalists, but have also received strong pushback from incumbent stakeholders, regulators, and courts. The spectrum of responses is dramatically
broad. While some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom
and San Francisco are positioning themselves as champions of
the platform by introducing policies that will aid its expansion,

-opportunity.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (describing the scale and growth
of businesses within the sharing economy).
14. Aereo allowed individuals to record live over-the-air television without
the costs associated with cable television. See infra text accompanying notes
55–58.
15. See generally Two Distinct Ways To Utilize Decobike, DECOBIKE,
http://www.decobike.com/sandiego/how-it-works (last visited Oct. 14, 2016)
(describing the process for using the bike sharing service, Decobike).
16. One such service is HomeExchange, which allows individuals to swap
homes with other individuals for short periods of time. Here’s How Home Exchange Works, HOMEEXCHANGE, https://www.homeexchange.com/en/how-it
-works (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
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other legal regimes such as those in New York, Nevada, Florida, and Germany are introducing new policies to constrain the
platform. Around the United States, class actions against Uber,
17
Lyft, and other platform apps are underway. The scholarly
debates are schismatic, either celebrating the platform economy as a utopic shift from capitalism to communal sharing, or
decrying the dystopian effects of the platform evading existing
regulations and protections.
Despite the tremendous interest that the platform is attracting from regulators and scholars, the literature has thus
far failed to offer a comprehensive account of law in the new
platform economy. Are companies like Uber and Lyft digital
clearinghouses connecting independent drivers-for-hire with
customers, or rather are they employers violating wage-andhour laws? Are zoning laws parsing parts of town for shortterm rentals still relevant when residential property owners
list their homes on Airbnb? Was Aereo, which went bankrupt
following its recent Supreme Court defeat, a digital antenna
rental company, or a service that streams broadcasted content,
thereby infringing copyright? Is TaskRabbit just an app to connect people searching for odd jobs, or a manpower agency that
should withhold taxes? Companies such as Uber, Lyft, Airbnb,
Aereo, and TaskRabbit have been running against existing
regulations and the legal battles often turn on how to define
the platform business: Are these digital companies service providers or brokers of individualized exchanges? Should they be
viewed as merely enabling intermediaries or robust corporate
infrastructures?
This Article argues that the platform economy is presenting not only a paradigmatic shift for business, but also for legal
theory. Consumer protection laws, safety and health regulations, business permits and licenses, property and zoning laws,
and financial services regulations have all risen dramatically in
the past few decades. The reasons for this surge range from
public welfare and quality control to less benign goals, such as
entry restrictions, lobbied for by incumbent industry actors.
17. See Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being
Sued to Death, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/
3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death (describing a class-action lawsuit against the platform app, Handy); Marcus Pringle,
California Court Addresses Employee Status of Uber, Lyft Drivers, ROETZEL
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.ralawemployment.blogspot.com/2015/02/california
-court-addresses-employee.html (noting the initiation of class-action lawsuits
against both Uber and Lyft).
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Each body of law is increasingly at odds with bottom-up online
platform businesses that offer new models of connectivity and
exchange. The platform economy does not only disrupt regulated industries but also demands that we inquire into the logic of
their correlated regulations. It requires that we go back to first
principles about public intervention and market innovation, or,
what I term, the regulation-innovation nexus.
The Article uncovers the ways in which digital platformbased businesses challenge the internal logic of regulated industries. By unpacking the economic and social impetuses for
the rise of the platform economy, the Article develops a new
framework for asking whether digital disruptions comprise
loopholes akin to regulatory arbitrage, most prominently studied in the tax field; circumvention akin to controversial copyright protection reforms; or innovation-ripe negative spaces
akin to design-around competition in patent law. This Article,
by bringing together these different bodies of law, offers a contemporary account of the relevance of regulating new business
models. Providing a new framework for understanding the regulation-innovation nexus, the Article argues that the legal disruptions created by the platform economy should be viewed as
a feature, rather than a bug of regulatory limits.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the spectrum of conceptual challenges presented by third-generation
digital business models, Web 3.0. The literature about the platform is binary. There are feel-good stories about the revolutionary power of sharing and the easy rise of micro-entrepreneurs
and grassroots exchanges contrasted against dystopian predictions about the platform subverting established protections and
unraveling the checks and balances historically placed to correct the market-produced unfairness. Transcending this utopian/dystopian binary, Part II analyzes the technological, economic, and social reasons for the rise of the platform economy
and the ways the platform is changing each stage and aspect of
market transaction costs. First, taking a Coasean perspective,
Part II.A develops a novel taxonomy of ten distinct principles of
the platform that together hold the potential to systematically
reduce transaction costs: uber-scale, resurrection of dead capital, tailoring the transactional unit, the commodification of everything, deal customization, access over ownership, overhead
elimination, reduced barriers to entry, pricing precision, and
dynamic feedback systems. Next, in Part II.B, the Article shifts
beyond the classic transaction-cost economic analysis to a be-
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havioral perspective, explaining how the platform shapes preference. The Section asserts that part of the value produced by
the platform lies in its differentiation from traditional, offline
exchanges. In other words, it reveals how the platform economy
is not simply competing efficiently over the same markets of
regulated industries but also constituting new markets, norms,
and behaviors.
Building upon these understandings of the internal logic
informing the platform economy’s rise, Part III offers a new
framework for understanding the range of laws and regulations
that platform companies currently face. The Article shows that
the regulatory challenges are divisible into easy and hard cases. On one end of the spectrum are regulatory restrictions that
operate as barriers to entry, including permitting, occupational
licensing, and rate controls. These are the easy cases—
regulatory controls that regulators should not impose on the
platform because they are largely designed to prevent entry.
On the other end are taxation requirements. These are equally
easy because they should be extended to the platform in a
straightforward manner, and existing tax law lends itself to
direct application on these new digital market exchanges. The
hard cases encompass what lies in the regulatory spectrum between barriers to market entry and the taxation of revenues,
namely laws for zoning, consumer protection, employment and
labor, and intellectual property. These regulatory fields each
have public welfare goals challenged by the shifts in market
models, emerging social norms, and unstable preferences.
Moreover, many of these regulatory goals are achievable
through utilizing the technological advances of the very same
business models that are disrupting established structures.
Therefore, any inquiry into the regulation-innovation nexus
requires an understanding of the comparative advantages of
public intervention and the platform’s self-regulation. Part IV
maps those latter shifts onto concepts based in innovation theory and policy—an interdisciplinary inquiry examining the role
of law and regulation in the diffusion of technology and ideas.
Integrating insights from different fields of law about regulatory disruption, it considers the continued necessity of certain
protections and examines the rise of self-regulatory practices.
The Article demonstrates that the platform economy is still
very much evolving, frequently comes with built-in regulatory
devices, and thrives because of definitional defiance. By offering a first schematic treatment of law and the platform econo-
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my, this Article aims to provide scholars and policymakers a
framework that identifies the conditions under which new
business models transform economic structures and how law
maps onto those shifts.
I. CECI N’EST PAS UN TAXI: DISRUPTION &
DEFINITIONAL DEFIANCE
In the interest of eliminating bureaucracy, overhead, middlemen and
waste, I turned myself into a corporation. –Joel Stein, Time Maga18
zine

A. WEB 3.0: THE PLATFORM REVOLUTION
Platform companies defy traditional regulatory theory the
same way they defy traditional definition—by varying the
products, services, and methods they employ to connect buyers
and sellers, workers and those in need of services. For this reason, the platform economy is easier to explain by way of function: a platform company is launched as an online intermediary
between buyers and sellers of goods and services—the ancient
role of the middleman—enhanced with the modern power afforded by cloud computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive
wireless Internet access, scaled user-networks, and nearuniversal customer ownership of smartphones and tablets.
While earlier companies such as eBay and Amazon have served
as a model for new platform companies, those companies mainly focused on retail of goods as well as online connectivity. More
recently, the new wave of digital companies is based on the logic of multi-sided markets that disrupt traditional offline interactions by reshaping the ways individuals transact. Thus, while
the timeline is not set in stone, it is useful to mark 2008, with
the founding of Airbnb as the rise of the new wave of the platform—a stunning number of fast-growing of algorithm-enabled
cyber-places where constituents transact. Before that, there
were some important developments in digital connectivity and
sharing, including the launch of Napster in 1999, the rise of
Wikipedia in 2001, and the spread of social networks, primarily
19
Facebook and LinkedIn in 2004. These companies, however,
18. Joel Stein, Baby, You Can Drive My Car, and Do My Errands, and
Rent My Stuff..., TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.time.com/3687305/testing
-the-sharing-economy.
19. For a useful timeline graphic on the rise of the sharing economy, see
Collaborative Consumption Infographic Timeline Chart, COLLABORATIVE
CONSUMPTION, https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/images/Collaborativechart.jpg
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created multi-sided connectivity that, for the most part, existed
solely in the digital world. Therefore, as I will describe below,
these developments are best understood as a prelude to the rise
of the platform economy, an earlier generation of online innovation. The new generation of platform business is increasingly
challenging conventional industries in every realm. You don’t
need to open a restaurant to host cooking events; you don’t
need to become a taxi driver to sell rides; you don’t need to open
a hotel to lodge guests; you don’t need to start a moving company to get paid for helping someone relocate.
Industries affected by the platform economy include hotels
(Airbnb; Couchsurfing; Homeaway; VRBO); office space (Liquid
Space; ShareDesk), parking spaces (ParkingPanda; Park Circa); transportation (Lyft; Sidecar; Uber); restaurants (EatWith;
Feastly; Blue Apron; Munchery); used clothing (ThredUp);
household tools (Open Shed); outdoor gear (Gearcommons); capital (Zopa; Prosper; Kickstarter; Bitcoin; Kiva); broadcasting
(Aereo; FilmOn.com); legal services (Upcounsel); medical services (Healthtap; Teledoc; CrowdMed); academic services
(Uguru); everyday errands, such as grocery shopping and laundry (TaskRabbit; Instacart; Airtasker; Washio); and specialized
errands, such as flower delivery (BloomThat), dog walking
(DogVacay), and package delivery (Shyp). Over 10,000 new
platform companies have sprouted and mushroomed in less
20
than a decade, and they continue to pop up daily. The platform economy, while not easy to define or quantify, was valued
at $26 billion in 2013, with predictions of exponential growth
21
up to $110 billion in the next few years. A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report predicts that global revenues from
22
the platform sectors could hit $335 billion by 2025. “[L]ike
Uber but for ___” pitches for venture capital funding are a daily
23
occurrence.

(last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
20. Stein, supra note 18.
21. Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing
Economy Can Win over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://
www.hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over
-regulators.
22. The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, supra note
13.
23. Kate Cox, Nobody Really Knows What To Do About Regulating the
Sharing Economy, CONSUMERIST (June 10, 2015), https://www.consumerist
.com/2015/06/10/nobody-really-knows-what-to-do-about-regulating-the-sharing
-economy.
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As noted, the platform economy’s offerings are so diverse
that neatly describing its scope is impractical. There are various ways to slice it. It includes the delivery of services, the
sharing of assets, and the recirculation of goods, yet its rise
must be understood in relation to its digital genealogy. Firstgeneration Internet companies introduced search engines like
Google and Yahoo, which connected us to information and
knowledge. Tim Berners-Lee, best known as the inventor of the
World Wide Web, described the original essence of the Web as a
24
space to collaborate, communicate, and share information.
The second generation, Web 2.0, extended search and communication, forming online marketplaces like Craigslist, eBay, and
Amazon, as well as digital file sharing services like Napster
and iTunes. These online companies disrupted the publishing,
traditional news media, music, and most broadly, retail industry at large. Amazon transformed and constricted the bricksand-mortar bookstores, and file sharing, coupled with digital
music and film, changed the entertainment industry, effectively
killing record and video stores. Moving beyond retail, the rise of
the platform signifies the third generation of the Internet, Web
3.0, in which technology is transforming the service economy,
25
allowing greater access to offline exchanges for lower prices.
In turn, the physical infrastructure of offline markets is itself
transformed by the technological infrastructure.
Founded in San Francisco in 2008, Airbnb allows private
individuals—named hosts—to rent out their homes or individu26
al rooms to visitors for a short amount of time. Within just a
few years, Airbnb has grown dramatically; and is valued at $10
27
billion with 2,000,000 properties listed in more than 190 coun28
tries. Analysts estimate that in 2015, Airbnb made $6 billion
29
in gross bookings. It now offers more bookings than major ho24. Web’s Inventor Gets a Knighthood, BBC NEWS (last updated Dec. 31,
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3357073.stm.
25. See infra Figure 1; see also Stein, supra note 18 (noting that technology has “come after” the service economy, with increased consumer access and
lower prices).
26. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy,
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/
airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy.
27. Cannon & Summers, supra note 21.
28. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
29. Rafat Ali, Airbnb’s Revenues Will Cross Half Billion Mark in 2015,
Analysts Estimate, SKIFT (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.skift.com/2015/03/25/
airbnbs-revenues-will-cross-half-billion-mark-in-2015-analysts-estimate.
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30

tel chains, such as Marriott and Hilton. At the same time,
Airbnb defines itself very differently than a hotel chain, and, as
it disrupts the hotel industry, it faces legal attacks on both legislative and judicial fronts. In response to these vigorous attempts to limit the platform’s operation, Airbnb has argued
that existing laws simply neither capture its new business
31
model, nor even fit the new economy. Airbnb describes its
business model as a matching platform for private homes, connecting private individuals to other private individuals, while
32
collecting a six percent to twelve percent booking fee. Airbnb
owns no property and provides no services outside the digital
33
realm. Similarly, in the commercial real estate rental market,
Loosecubes, Regus, and DeskWanted have carved out the
shared office space market, matching people who have an extra
desk, studio, or office space with independent freelancers and
34
entrepreneurs. Following a similar business model to Airbnb,
Loosecubes charged a ten percent fee for each transaction, of35
fering spaces in 535 cities throughout sixty-six countries.
Valued at over $40 billion, Uber is perhaps the best-known
36
example of a disruptive digital platform business. Founded in
2009, the company coordinates over one million rides a day and
37
is now valued higher than rental car giants Hertz and Avis.
30. Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are
Quiet, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
12/business/airbnb-grows-to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for
-now.html.
31. David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/
business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html.
32. What Are Guest Services Fees?, AIRBNB, http://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/104/what-are-guest-service-fees (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
33. Rob Preston, Digital Disruption: It’s Not What You Think,
FORBES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2015/04/20/digital
-disruption-its-not-what-you-think.
34. See About DeskWanted, DESKWANTED, https://deskwanted.wordpress
.com/about (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (describing the service that DeskWanted
provides and how the company works); Company Profile, REGUS, http://b.regus
.com/investors/company-profile (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (providing a general
company profile for investors regarding Regus’s activities).
35. 7 Start-Ups Inspired by Craigslist, AABACO SMALL BUS., https://www
.aabacosmallbusiness.com/advisor/7-start-ups-inspired-craigslist-210000849
.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
36. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE
SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/
publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf.
37. Ellen Huet, Uber Says It’s Doing 1 Million Rides per Day, 140 Million
in Last Year, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/
2014/12/17/uber-says-its-doing-1-million-rides-per-day-140-million-in-last
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Lyft, the second largest transportation platform company and
Uber’s competitor, has raised over $500 million in funding and
has tens of thousands of service-providers in over sixty-five cit38
ies. Other platform competitors have been established around
the world, such as BlaBlaCar, a France-based transportation
company, which raised $100 million in 2014 and recently ex39
panded into India, its fourteenth market. Other new companies focus on long-distance transportation, such as Tripda,
while still others focus on servicing particular markets, such as
universities (Zimride), women (Chariot for Women), and children (Kidz Kab). Each of these companies offers a creative take
on traditional markets and uses a variety of disruptive technologies to shake up their respective industries. These new transportation businesses match drivers and passengers via
smartphone technology and sophisticated matching algo40
rithms. Unlike taxicabs and limousines, these companies do
not position themselves as common carriers, and most do not
seek the regulatory licensing traditionally required for such
41
services. Uber asserts it is not a taxi business, but rather
merely an app and network. It argues that it owns no cabs and
the cab drivers are not employees, but rather independent con42
tractors. In public statements, Uber stresses that it “sees itself as a technology company” that “connects riders” with independent contractors who it considers to be true “high-quality
43
transportation providers.” The taxicab industry and some

-year; Will Oremus, Silicon Valley Uber Alles, SLATE (June 6, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/06/uber_17_billion_
valuation_it_s_now_worth_nearly_as_much_as_hertz_and_avis.html.
38. See Mark Sullivan, Lyft Has Raised a New $530M Round, Reaching a
Valuation of $3B, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.venturebeat
.com/2015/03/11/lyft-has-raised-a-new-530m-round-reaching-a-valuation-of-3breport.
39. Noyan Ayan, BlaBlaCar Expands Beyond Europe, Launches in India,
WEBRAZZI (Jan. 14, 2015), http://en.webrazzi.com/2015/01/14/blablacar
-launches-in-india; Lora Kolodny, French Company BlaBlaCar Raises $100M
To Make Ride-Sharing Easy, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2014/07/02/french-company-blablacar-raises-100m-to-make
-ride-sharing-easy.
40. Stephanie Francis Ward, ‘App’ Me a Ride: Internet Car Companies
Offer Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13.
41. Id.
42. Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES (June 10, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/
2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-ride-to-riches-the-uber-payoff.
43. Ward, supra note 40, at 14.
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44

regulators argue otherwise. Is Uber one big business? Is each
driver a small enterprise? Are Uber drivers workers, independent contractors, or franchisees?
These questions are far from theoretical. They are acute
and pervasive. These services are available in over 1000 cities,
and new models continue to develop rapidly. For example, other companies—still within transportation—are disrupting the
car rental industry. Car2Go and ZipCar offer short-term use of
45
a smart car in a designated zone. DecoBike offers the use of
46
bikes throughout the city, and returns at designated locations.
Getaround, founded in San Francisco, allows car owners to rent
47
out their vehicles. While these companies use different levels
of platform connectivity, they are each presenting innovative
tools to match physical services with those who need them. Disrupting the service and staffing industry, TaskRabbit, similarly
founded in San Francisco, allows users to list errands they need
48
completed, including handyman jobs and personal assistance.
Taskers, the people who have been certified by the site, bid to
work on the tasks, and TaskRabbit, the company, typically
takes a fifteen percent to thirty percent fee from the offered
49
50
price. Need a dog walker? DogVacay will link you to one.
51
Need a teacher? Skillshare will connect you. Need a programmer to update a Wikipedia entry? Fiverr will find you
52
one.
Disrupting the restaurant market by directly connecting
foodies and chefs using digital technologies, EatWith aggregates offerings of secret suppers and pop-up restaurants, hosted in an individual’s home or other private spaces, where chefs
prepare food in a noncommercial kitchen without formal per-

44. Id.
45. CAR2GO, https://www.car2go.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016); ZIPCAR,
http://www.zipcar.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
46. DECOBIKE, supra note 15.
47. How It Works, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last
visited Oct. 14, 2016).
48. What Does TaskRabbit Offer?, TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit
.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411410-What-does-TaskRabbit-Offer (last visited
Oct. 14, 2016).
49. What Is the TaskRabbit Service Fee?, TASKRABBIT, https://support
.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411610-What-is-the-TaskRabbit-Service
-Fee (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
50. DOGVACAY, https://www.dogvacay.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
51. SKILLSHARE, https://www.skillshare.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
52. FIVERR, https://www.fiverr.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
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mits of city health and code enforcement officials. Some of
these culinary events are set up through less specialized online
sites and instead come together using existing social media
54
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
Disrupting network broadcasting and cable providers,
Aereo was a start-up founded in 2012 that allowed subscribers
to watch and record live TV over the Internet for a monthly
55
fee. It maintained a bank of miniature, dime-sized antennas
within each city it operated, and, much like old rabbit ears,
56
pulled down local TV signals broadcast over-the-air. Every
time a subscriber wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo as57
signed them an antenna. Anticipating the copyright challenges that it would face, Aereo took separate recordings for every
single person watching and provided the user full control over
58
what content they wanted to save and play. Despite these efforts to use technological innovation to avoid such a ruling, the
company went bankrupt when, in 2014, the United States Supreme Court held that the digital platform was illegally dis59
rupting the broadcasting industry.
The common pattern that emerges is a definitional one.
Platform companies adamantly endeavor to be defined first and
foremost by what they are not. These companies are not selling
the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather,
they are selling access to the software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between
60
their users. In turn, the platform breaks down traditional in53. Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs,
Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 17
(2015) (noting the non-regulated “pop-up” nature of underground dining); Who
We Are, EATWITH, https://www.eatwith.com/about (last visited Oct. 14, 2016)
(describing EatWith’s purpose and mode of operation).
54. Schindler, supra note 53, at 18.
55. Jacob Kastrenakes, Aereo Loses to Broadcasters in Supreme Court
Fight for Its Life, THE VERGE (June 25, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/
6/25/5801052/aereo-supreme-court-ruling.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Aereo, Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by IAC;
New Technology Platform Allows Consumers Access to Live TV over the Internet, MARKETWIRED (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.marketwired.com/press
-release/aereo-announces-205m-series-a-financing-led-iac-new-technology
-platform-allows-consumers-nasdaq-iaci-1619629.htm.
59. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files
-for-bankruptcy.html?_r=0.
60. Darcy Allen, What Is a Taxi? Regulation and the Sharing Economy,
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dustry categorizations and, as a result, presents a challenge
when labeling the nature of the business by creating an ambiguous relationship between the provider and user; employer and
employee; and owner and consumer.
Figure 1: Start-Ups & Regulated Corollaries
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B. THE EVERYTHING PLATFORM: CHALLENGING LABELS AS A
FORM OF INNOVATION
The staggering rise of online networks and digital service
companies raises questions about the nature of platform businesses and how they generate their value; yet, the platform
economy defies simple definitions. The platform economy is a
system characterized primarily by what it’s not: conventional

OECD INSIGHTS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.oecdinsights.org/2014/12/22/what
-is-a-taxi-regulation-and-the-sharing-economy.
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and static. The most important aspect of the platform economy
is that it includes an ecology of continuously evolving business
models. The initial inquiries about their essence and character
point to the very challenge of classification—we are in unchartered territories, a new zone of economic relations. Law and
language attempt to chart boundaries, and yet they are inherently limited to covering the existing forms of life and bounds of
human imagination. Innovation is always disruptive in that
regard. When it comes to new industries and embryonic business models, lawmakers need to tread carefully. Though this
has always been true, the platform is introducing new models
and structures of exchange at unprecedented rates. Platform
companies often have few real assets, and their value is embedded in their technology, user base, and brand. Moreover,
platform companies can quickly morph and expand, rendering
this definitional-defiant innovation unstoppable. Consider
Uber’s ambitions for a moment. Uber recently changed its motto from “[e]veryone’s private driver” to “[w]here lifestyle meets
61
logistics.” The shift from “driving” to “lifestyle” is telling.
Uber’s critical mass of users and continuous perfection of its
software are both opening opportunities for expansion. Why
stop at rides when it can offer delivery services and carpooling?
Why stop at cars when the technology it develops is extendable
to other forms of transportation, such as boats, planes, and,
eventually, driverless cars?
This is not a futuristic dream, but instead an emerging reality. Uber has launched a courier delivery service, UberRUSH,
as well as UberBOAT, a service to request a water taxi around
harbors, which is currently operating in Boston but soon expanding to Sydney, Australia, and elsewhere (in addition to
Uber’s boating services, other actors in the platform economy
62
are offering flights). UberPOOL coordinates individual riders
63
who are traveling to similar locations along a similar route. If
there is a match found along the route, the app notifies the rid64
er with their co-rider’s first name. Clearly, Uber aspires to be
61. Adam Vaccaro, Uber Isn’t a Car Service. It’s the Future of Logistics,
INC. (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.inc.com/adam-vaccaro/uber-isnt-a-car-service
.html.
62. DARCY ALLEN & CHRIS BERG, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, THE SHARING
ECONOMY: HOW OVER-REGULATION COULD DESTROY AN ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
6 (2014), https://www.ipa.org.au/portal/uploads/Sharing_Economy_
December_2014.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Public Utilities Commission in California decided that Uber’s
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the “Everything Platform,” similar to how Amazon morphed
from a bookstore to the “Everything Store.” In 2015, Uber announced that it is investing in the research and development of
65
self-driving cars. Uber also recently announced that it would
develop its own mapping platform and move away from Google
66
Maps. At the same time, Google is also realizing the potential
of what can, in effect, only be described as the “Everything
Economy” and has announced its own ambition in getting into
67
the ride-sharing service game with self-driving cars. A new
venture in Silicon Valley, appropriately called Magic, promises
to push the platform’s vision of totality further. Magic’s business model is its promise to deliver “anything you want (and
they do mean anything) as long as it’s legal”—a tiger to your
68
door, sushi on a boat, or your parking ticket handled. The
company launched in February 2015 and logged 17,000 re69
quests in its first forty-eight hours of operation. Magic indeed.
As the platform continues to morph and expand, the disruption of conventional business models, definitional bounda70
ries, and doctrinal order will swell. A recent PwC report calls
companies to audit all tangible and intangible assets that could
potentially be profitably introduced into the platform, including
71
energy, telecoms, and retailing. As it continues to grow, the
platform can be best understood as clusters of market developments—driven by network technology—that continuously disnew carpooling service is illegal because two distinct riders pay separate fares
to share one car. Mark Rogowsky, California Threatens To Shut Down Uber’s
New Carpooling Service, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/markrogowsky/2014/09/12/california-threatens-to-shut-down-ubers-paid
-carpools/#76b77d967939.
65. John Biggs, Uber Opening Robotics Research Facility in Pittsburgh To
Build Self-Driving Cars, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.techcrunch
.com/2015/02/02/uber-opening-robotics-research-facility-in-pittsburgh-to-build
-self-driving-cars.
66. Leslie Hook, Uber To Pour $500m into Global Mapping Project, FIN.
TIMES (July 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e0dfa45e-5522-11e6-befd
-2fc0c26b3c60.
67. Will Oremus, Whoa, If True: Is Google Launching an Uber Rival?,
SLATE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/02/
google_uber_rival_bloomberg_reports_google_working_on_ride_hailing_app
.html.
68. Sarah Buhr, Magic Is a Startup that Promises To Bring You Anything—If You’re Willing To Pay for It, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2015), https://
www.techcrunch.com/2015/02/23/magic-is-a-startup-that-promises-to-bring
-you-anything-if-youre-willing-to-pay-for-it.
69. Id.
70. See infra Figure 2.
71. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 36, at 14, 28.
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rupt previous notions of economies of production, consumption,
finance, knowledge, and education. The potential, as well as the
peril, of such an amorphous beast is at the core of the regulatory pushbacks it is encountering, and even more fundamentally,
the binary accounts of its utopian or dystopian nature.
Figure 2: Fifty Ways to Look at the Platform
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C. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY: ROMANTIC UTOPIA OR
NIGHTMARE DYSTOPIA?
The realities of the recent cycles of financial crises and
economic restructuring, together with advances in digital technology and shifts in lifestyle, have created the perfect storm for
the platform economy. The reasons for the rise of the platform
economy are key to analyzing the contemporary challenges presented by existing regulations and the normative questions
about law’s continued role. Contemporary debates, however,
fail to reflect this complexity. One of the striking dimensions of
public debates about the platform is the strong, bipolar descriptions of its revolutionary potential. These descriptions are
largely raised with broad brushstrokes and absolute terms, either hailing the platform as the anti-corporate utopian answer
to twentieth-century discontentment or an accelerated path to
further injustice and inequality. While many celebrate the platform’s potential to positively transform capitalism into something kinder and fairer, others view that transformation as
dangerous to work relations, consumer welfare, distributive
justice, and regulatory compliance. Proponents romantically
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envision the platform as a return to the days free from corporate dominance, when interactions happened directly and intimately between individuals, when design was bottom-up and
72
relationships were based on community rather than markets.
For opponents, it is a dystopian uber-capitalist development in
which every interaction becomes the basis of market exchanges,
privacy and leisure are lost, and Silicon Valley style73
libertarians become richer at the expense of everyone else.
Many commentators decry that “regulatory mechanisms
74
have not kept pace” and consumers are hurt as platform businesses avoid established regulations and “typically operate out75
side them.” Most of all, some assert that platforms do not
simply rise by avoiding regulatory compliance, but that growth
is instead directly linked to the desire of businesses to avoid the
laws and economic practices designed to enhance employee welfare, such as long-term employment, liability and insurance,
and product quality control, all of which create the bedrock of
twentieth century business practices. For example, progressive
economist Dean Baker views the platform as “largely based on
evading regulations and breaking the law,” subjecting consum76
ers to substandard, and often unsafe, products and services.
Speaking directly to the utopian/dystopian duality, Anthony
Kalamar has coined the term “sharewashing,” in which platform companies, under the guise of the misleading term “sharing economy,” shift liability and risk onto employees and con77
sumers. Others similarly contend, “There is little doubt that

72. See, e.g., Rosie Neve, A Sharing Community: It Takes a Village, INDE(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and
-families/features/a-sharing-community-it-takes-a-village-9008977.html (discussing examples of communities uniting).
73. See, e.g., Richard Eskow, Rise of the Techno-Libertarians: The 5 Most
Socially Destructive Aspects of Silicon Valley, SALON (Apr. 12, 2015), http://
www.salon.com/2015/04/12/rise_of_the_techno_libertarians_the_5_most_
socially_destructive_aspects_of_silicon_valley_partner.
74. Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J., Spring 2014, at 6.
75. Alexandra Chang, Regulation Won’t Kill the Sharing Economy. We
Just Need New Rules, POPULAR SCI. (July 8, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/
article/technology/regulation-wont-kill-sharing-economy-we-just-need-new
-rules.
76. Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber
Are Facilitating Rip-Offs, The GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), http://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation.
77. Anthony Kalamar, Sharewashing Is the New Greenwashing,
OPEDNEWS (May 13, 2013), http://www.opednews.com/articles/Sharewashing
-is-the-New-Gr-by-Anthony-Kalamar-130513-834.html.
PENDENT
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the pro-sharing discourse is blind to the dark side of these in78
novations.” The contrasting voices, celebrating or denouncing
the rise of the platform, are difficult to reconcile. At the same
time, a consensus emerges from the heated debate: a paradigmatic shift is underway and its costs, benefits, and legal implications are still unsettled.
II. PRINCIPLES OF THE PLATFORM
A. TRANSACTION COSTS REVOLUTION
Can this new set of marketplaces continue to make admirable profits
while enabling the casual owner to monetize possessions or skills that
79
were otherwise collecting dust? –Mike Jones, Forbes

In 1960, R.H. Coase first wrote about the inherent inefficiencies in the market, sourced in the high transaction costs
incurred throughout the stages of a deal: “[O]perations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent
many transactions that would be carried out in a world in
80
which the pricing system worked without cost.” Transaction
costs include search and information costs for who and what to
deal with; negotiation and decision costs, which include bargaining for the terms of the deal, reaching an agreed upon
price, and drafting the contract; and monitoring and compliance costs necessary for successfully carrying out the terms of
81
the deal. In other words, transaction costs can be classified
into three categories that correlate with the three stages of predeal, deal-making, and post-deal: (1) search costs; (2) bargain82
ing and decision costs; and (3) policing and enforcement costs.
Each stage relies on information to reduce costs. The platform,
which increases connectivity, access to information, and the
application of advanced technology to every aspect of a deal,
impacts the relevant transaction costs at all three stages. As

78. JULIET SCHOR, GREAT
ING ECONOMY 11 (2014).

TRANSITION INITIATIVE, DEBATING THE SHAR-

79. Mike Jones, How Capitalism and Regulation Will Reshape the Sharing Economy, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/
2013/10/09/how-capitalism-and-regulation-will-reshape-the-sharing-economy/
#d4c6a19e8a8b.
80. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16
(1960).
81. Id. at 15; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The
Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 549 (1981).
82. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141,
148 (1979).
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the platform grows, efficiencies grow as well. In a systemic
way, the market, quite simply, is perfecting.
The platform is driven first and foremost by a combination
of technological advancements. In less than a decade, total In83
ternet access has grown by over 500 percent. Most American
consumers have at least one mobile device with access to highspeed networks, GPS, and smart apps. Most of the Western
world now has Internet access, and the developing world is rapidly gaining access as well. Analysts predict 50 billion mobile
84
wireless devices will connect to the Internet by 2020. With
more users, as well as enhanced matching algorithms, pricing
software, resource division to tailor each deal, and data mining
to monitor the exchange, transaction costs are reduced dramatically.
This Section presents ten fundamental principles of the
platform economy. They include the shift from ownership to
access (proprietas to usus), the monetization of excess, the reduction of overhead, and the extension of the life cycle of products. These principles also include the dynamic use of pricing
algorithms and rating data. A platform company need not embody all ten principles but as a general matter, these principles
represent the revolutionary nature that characterizes the platform. As will be described in Part II.B, beyond the platform’s
efficiency enhancing principles, the rise of the platform economy is also driven by shifting preferences, including an increased desire for choice and variety, an authentic experience,
the reduction of one’s carbon footprint, and a general anticorporate sentiment. Whether the platform actually offers what
it sells is, at least in part, separate and distinct from the question of what it is selling: a lifestyle filled with authentic unique
experiences, responsible green consumption, social connectivity, and consumer empowerment.
1. Economies of Scale
In the industrial era, corporate structures allowed markets
to scale. The scale of informal exchanges was small and left unregulated. As platform companies enter to compete with established industries, they are increasingly taking a lion’s share of
their anti-industry. Perhaps counterintuitively, the rise in
83. DAVE EVANS, CISCO INTERNET BUS. SOLS. GRP., THE INTERNET OF
THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET IS CHANGING EVERYTHING 3 (2011).
84. Id.
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wireless technology and the expansion of online connectivity
has allowed a return, in some ways, to the pre-industrial village—bartering, sharing, and other direct individual-toindividual monetized exchanges. Despite this retro feel, however, the platform village is nothing like the physical village. Rather, platform companies connect strangers on a highly intense
global scale. That potential to connect users all around the
world digitally is unprecedented.
2. No More Waste
A key principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to
work. The platform enables a more efficient use of private resources. People shelve most assets for the majority of the time
they own that product. Cars are driven less than eight percent
85
of the day. The lawn mower is used once every two weeks. The
spare bedroom is occupied only twice a year when the in-laws
visit. Still on the supply side, with downturns in the labor market and high unemployment rates, many seek to fill up their
free time and leverage their flexibility to earn extra income. In
other words, the platform resurrects dormant capital—be it
86
tangible products or human capital. This includes dormant
labor capacity both in the form of downtime and as skills people
have but could not previously monetize. Many people are good
cooks, handymen, home-designers, computer whizzes, artists,
or writers but do not use those skills professionally. The platform economy gives people who have developed a skill unrelated to their main source of income the ability to commercialize
that skill. In other words, supply is increased by adding underutilized assets into the market and, in turn, costs are reduced.
3. Tailoring the Transactional Unit
Platforms are also ushering the end of idle capacity by allowing users to slice up time and space into smaller units. The
platform breaks down both supply and demand into tiny modalities: short-term rentals, a few minutes of personal assistance,
a couple of hours of furniture installation, or an evening a week
enjoying an amateur chef’s dinner at her private home. There
85. See Paul Barter, “Cars Are Parked 95% of the Time.” Let’s Check!, REPARKING (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.reinventingparking.org/2013/
02/cars-are-parked-95-of-time-lets-check.html.
86. Daniel M. Rothschild, How Uber and Airbnb Resurrect ‘Dead Capital,’
ÜMLAUT (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.theumlaut.com/2014/04/09/how-uber-and
-airbnb-resurrect-dead-capital.
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is efficiency in renting a car for an hour rather than for a day;
in crashing on someone’s couch rather than getting your own
hotel room; and in renting a house together with two other families instead of three suites at an established resort. Digital
technology facilitates these smaller exchanges, a feature Yochai
87
Benkler has termed “granularity,” which would otherwise be
impossible without instantaneous communication among millions of individuals. The platform allows services and products
to be rented out by the minute, resulting in an extremely small
transactional unit.
4. We Are All Capitalists Now
Sharing is growing exponentially, but it is not free. True,
the platform offers bartering (Babysitting Co-ops), gifting
(Freecycle and Kashless), and swapping (thredUP and
SwapTree) options, but even those exchanges formalize and
systemically record previously informal exchanges. The lion’s
share of exchanges on the platform, however, is based on the
price of renting, trading, servicing, and lending. In fact, in
many ways, the platform tilts the balance away from altruistic/communal interactions to marketable/commodified exchanges. Imagine the monetization of everything. From a Coasean
transaction cost perspective, quite intuitively, ubercapitalization is another way in which supply increases, resulting in reduced costs for consumers. At the same time, there are,
of course, costs to monetizing everything: your leisure time,
your friendships, and your private home. The platform takes
the saying that everything, and everyone, has a price quite literally.
5. From Prêt-à-Porter to the People’s Haute Couture
In the wake of several economic downturns, consumers are
demanding more competitive prices and smaller packaging of
their services. They are also demanding more input into the
metrics of what they consume. The platform promises to end
the conflict between non-tailored supply and specific demands.
As offerings become extremely disaggregated, consumers can
find exactly what they were looking for: renting a non-smoking,
pet-friendly, Kosher, and partly furnished apartment for three
nights in a specific neighborhood, with specified features, and

87. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 100 (2006).

HOW SOCIAL PRODUC-
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at a specific cost. In other words, the platform facilitates better
customization of the terms and conditions of the transaction to
fit individual needs with a new degree of specificity.
6. Access over Ownership
Zero waste and the resurrection of dead capital are achievable because consumption culture has shifted from being dominated by acquisition into a mindset of access. Owning a car is
not as important as the ability to use one when needed. Consumers don’t feel a need to purchase the lawn mower, and are
instead satisfied just knowing that one is there when the grass
has grown. In particular, as population density and urbanization continue to rise, congestion and smaller spaces push consumers to place access above ownership. This shift from ownership to access further reduces transaction costs by reducing the
stakes of the deal. Purchasing an annual membership in a car
sharing platform is not as weighty of a deal as buying a car,
and purchasing use of a car for an hour is not as costly as renting it for a day.
7. Less Overhead
The platform has further decentralized transactions by reducing intermediation. No more middleman, besides—of
course—the platform. Direct exchanges between private individuals are not new, but they are happening on an unprecedented scale. Technology allows private parties to coordinate
directly without the need of anything beyond the software. As
described in Part I, while the business models of platform companies vary significantly, many platform companies charge
around fifteen percent for each transaction they facilitate. This
overhead is far smaller than when off-line companies offer similar services in their respective industries. Online companies
have far fewer expenses than their off-line counterparts: they
do not own the assets they broker or employ the people who
exchange their labor. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the question of cost is inextricably tied to the question of regulation.
Costs inevitably increase if, for example, Uber is legally
deemed to be an employer of all the drivers it connects to passengers.
8. Reduced Barriers to Entry
The platform economy encourages new entrants into industries long entrenched with incumbents. Due to the reduction in

2016]

LAW OF THE PLATFORM

111

overhead, start-up costs to compete digitally are low. All you
need is a domain name and website. By providing marketplaces
of programmers, the platform has also lowered even these minimal setup costs. At the same time, the platform’s reliance on
scale and trust creates first mover and mass-scale advantages
for some, which suggests that we might witness recentraliza88
tion, even as the platform allows decentralization. Even more
importantly, there are virtually zero start-up costs to become a
user/provider, essentially a micro-entrepreneur, on one of the
existing platforms. Thus, the platform is fundamentally changing the way we exchange and interact as market actors. If you
want to test out your abilities as a chef or a bed and breakfast
host, you simply list your services on an existing platform and
wait for an offer.
9. Pricing Precision
When it was first founded, Airbnb realized that choosing a
price was the most difficult stage in the listing process for private hosts. Now Airbnb uses a sophisticated series of algorithms to suggest pricing. It developed a model for providing
dynamically tailored price recommendations based on location,
89
likeness to other properties, and time of the year. The model
takes into account variables like the temperature at any given
90
time as a proxy for seasonality. Similarly, Uber prices rides
dynamically, offering discounts when demand is lower while
91
raising prices in peak hours. Uber’s “dynamic” or “surge” pricing model adjusts to increase driver efficiency, which gives
92
more incentives for supply when demand is high. These sophisticated pricing algorithms, which continue to evolve
through systemic learning, allow for a more accurate valuation
of goods and services, and reduce both negotiation and uncertainty costs in striking the deal.

88. Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization,
and Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1470 (2014). This is partly why Uber,
Airbnb, and other major players appear to be pushing for being taxed, as they
now become wary of newcomers. See infra Part III.
89. ALLEN & BERG, supra note 62, at 21.
90. Id.
91. Rafi Mohammed, Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 9, 2014), https://www.hbr.org/2014/07/regulation-is
-hurting-cabs-and-helping-uber.
92. Dan Hill, OpenAir: Algorithmic Pricing, AIRBNB (May 7, 2014), http://
nerds.airbnb.com/openair-algorithmic-pricing. On the controversies surrounding Uber surge pricing, see infra Part III.B.3.
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10. Dynamic Information
Asymmetrical access to information greatly increases
transaction costs. Consumers do not know the quality of the
experience they are paying for until they consume it; individuals are not familiar with the service they paid for until after
they complete the transaction. Platforms combat this by offering dynamic ratings, reviews, and information, which reduce
uncertainty and strengthen consumer confidence. It also reduces monitoring costs as the certainty that one will receive a bad
review creates ex ante incentives to comply with the terms of
the deal. As will be discussed at more length in Part IV, the
same technological factors that dramatically reduce transaction
costs of search and negotiation also enable dynamic quality
monitoring, transparency, record-keeping, and data-mining
that reduce information asymmetry between providers and
consumers, building confidence in the deal. This confidence increases over time as interlocking networks in the platform mature.
B. MARKET CHALLENGING OR MARKET CREATING?
In large part, the battle over definitions, boundaries, and
regulation depends on understanding the economic logic of the
platform. Are new platform companies successfully competing
within established, regulated industries because they are introducing new business models and creating a substantively
different economic transaction, or because they seek regulatory
avoidance and generate value from such avoidance? Even if
they do not actively avoid regulations, the answer to whether to
extend existing regulations to the platform depends on whether
these new companies are, at their core, essentially similar to
the industries they disrupt. In other words, even when we recognize the economic logic of reducing transaction costs as the
core essence of the rise of the platform, we still need to answer
whether a platform company is either competing within an existing industry or carving out a new market. To this end, it is
important to recognize the difference between market competition and market differentiation. Adding to the complexity of the
regulation-innovation nexus at the heart of the platform economy is the fact that the platform is doing both: perfecting and
changing existing markets, as well as creating new ones.
In economics, “differentiation,” or “dynamic competition,”
refers to ways in which businesses compete, not simply over
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pricing, but over the kind of services and products offered. The
platform offers new experiences and shapes new preferences.
Take, for example, Uber and Lyft. At Uber, drivers add amenities to their cars, such as bottled water, tissues, or hard candy.
94
The transactions are cashless and tip-less, which is not only
meant to ensure convenience but also a sense of safety—and
perhaps a sense of trust and social connection by partially obscuring the monetary aspect of the exchange. In lifestyle consumption, such small differences matter and can modify the
experience. At Lyft, passengers ride shotgun with the drivers,
communicating a message of both parity and community inclusion. Ride-hailing platform companies also compete with ridesharing apps, in which people join drivers on their way to a
shared destination, which is even further along on the differentiation spectrum. This latter experience is one more akin to
carpooling, even if it is mediated through the platform and carries a price tag. The use of this platform to facilitate transactions is not only about saving money, but also carries the meaning of the environmentally responsible practice of reducing the
number of cars on the road.
Lifestyle and social meaning are important to the platform.
At the broadest level, the matching system provides a sense of
community, which maps onto a contemporary anti-corporatist
sentiment. People value the idea of paying the provider directly, even if the platform takes a cut: “[n]o matter how well
trained service employees might be, everyone is nicer when
they’re dealing with customers directly. Even customers. Nearly everyone who stays at an Airbnb rental, for instance, hangs
95
up their bathroom towels after they use them.”
The distinct experience of exchange through the platform
is significant if it changes the nature of the transaction, rather
than simply adding a competitor to the existing market. The
societal factors for the rise of the platform economy are multiple. Consumers convey a preference for a different kind of mar93. Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive
Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 60, 64 (1997).
94. As a result of the class action lawsuits against Uber by drivers who
claimed among other things that Uber violated state law by not transferring to
them tips which users believed were included in the transportation fare, Uber
now allows drivers in Massachusetts and California to post signs saying tips
are appreciated. See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, To Tip or Not To Tip Your
Uber Driver, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/
travel/uber-taxi-tipping.html?_r=0.
95. Stein, supra note 18.
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ket exchange. For example, the rise of lodging platforms such
as VRBO, Homeaway, and Airbnb can be linked to a sense of
adventure in renting a home directly from its owner, rather
than staying at a generic hotel chain. Foodies enjoy the idea of
eating at the private home of an aspiring chef and being the
first to discover the “new, new thing.” The fact that consumers
are choosing with their feet and reporting a preference for the
choices presented by platform companies is evident by the
96
sheer number of users.
At the same time, the choices and preferences are themselves formed by the embedding of the platform into our everyday life. Consider Airbnb. Studies find that consumers who use
Airbnb stay on vacation longer than they would if they stayed
at a hotel, and some guests would not have gone on a vacation
97
at all without access to the lodging platform. Airbnb commissioned a study that found that Airbnb rentals are cheaper than
hotels, leading people vacationing in California to stay longer
and spend on average thirty-one percent more than hotel
98
guests. The study also found that fourteen percent of customers would not have visited San Francisco at all if an Airbnb
99
stay was unavailable. In other words, the platform incited
their consumption rather than merely providing an alternative
brand within an existing consumer market. Similarly, the platform may go beyond fostering affordability and actually legitimize hiring a personal assistant, dog walker, driver, tutor, or
personal chef; purchases that would otherwise seem awkward
and unseemly to many people in an offline world. Web 3.0 is
transforming the lifestyle of the masses, rather than simply
facilitating better matches for a static equilibrium of supply
and demand. The platform is generating a different set of preferences and thereby reconfiguring markets.
The behavioral aspects and preference formation in the
platform can help explain the variance in the level of pushback

96. Matthew Mitchell, An Uber Challenge to Tacky Taxis, WASH. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/28/an-uber
-challenge-to-tacky-taxis; Jeremiah Owyang, People Are Sharing in the Collaborative Economy for Convenience and Price, WEB-STRATEGIST (Mar. 24,
2014),
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/03/24/people-are-sharing-in
-the-collaborative-economy-for-convenience-and-price.
97. Tomio Geron, Airbnb Had $56 Million Impact on San Francisco:
Study, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/
11/09/study-airbnb-had-56-million-impact-on-san-francisco/#4b1ba7824c2b.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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from established industries reacting to different platform disruptions. Juxtaposing the taxi industry for ride-sharing, and
the hotel industry for home-sharing, the hotel industry has
been much less averse to Airbnb compared to the taxi indus100
try’s reaction to Uber/Lyft. At least in part, the difference can
be explained by the elasticity in each of the markets, and
whether the platform presents direct competition. In general,
Airbnb competes more directly with bargain and boutique independent hotels, while luxury hotels and bigger hotel chains,
which cater to business clients, are less affected. A recent study
examining the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry finds only
a small, statistically insignificant negative effect of Airbnb on
101
upscale hotels. The study concludes that “[Airbnb’s] impact is
non-uniformly distributed, with lower-priced hotels, and those
hotels not catering to business travelers being the most affected” segments and that affected hotels have responded by reducing prices, “an impact that benefits all consumers, not just par102
ticipants in the sharing economy.”
At the same time, as we saw above, Airbnb is also changing
consumption patterns more fundamentally, helping consumers
imagine their dream vacations, plan trips that would not otherwise be planned, and stay longer at new cities. Indeed, the
paradigmatic shift enabled by the platform, from ownership to
access, maps onto contemporary social psychology research
showing that expenditures on experiences result in greater
103
happiness than purchases of tangible goods. These changing
patterns of experience consumption are endogenous to the rise
of the platform economy and can help explain how business
models such as Airbnb and Uber disrupt more than one industry. They reconfigure a range of industries by altering basic
patterns of supply and demand and shifting incentives previously associated with traditional purchasing decisions. Rather
than simply competing with the hotel industry, Airbnb inter-

100. Joe Kutura, Why the Hotel Industry Doesn’t Really Mind Airbnb,
PULSEPOINT (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.create.pulsepoint.com/article/
100003570.
101. Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating
the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 22 (B.U. Sch. of Mgmt. Res., Working Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2366898.
102. Id. at 1.
103. James Hamblin, Buy Experiences, Not Things, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 7,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/buy-experiences/
381132.
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venes in the hotel and real estate industries, rentals, and titles
in ways that shift the balance between these related industries.
The same holds true with Uber. It is creating disruption across
the taxi, car rental, and car seller markets.
Experiences in the platform are tailored and frequently
emphasize lifestyle. The platform, especially as it is still forming, often has the appeal of offering exclusive, hip, edgy, exciting, and unusual experiences, while—ironically—also providing
104
a sense of community, openness, and bottom-up expansion.
The anti-corporate, anti-ownership streak provides ephemeral
value to consumers, further helping explain the rapid rise of
the platform. People view platform companies as positively affecting anti-competitive forces: a rejection of corporate concentration, an anti-establishment, underground, or fringe experience. No doubt, as the platform grows, much of it will become
mainstream, and concentration will happen in the digital world
as well. Moreover, again paradoxically, the anti-corporate
streak also has, in some platform exchanges, an elitist undertone. A secret (and pricey) non-restaurant culinary dining
event set up through the platform can be characterized as
105
skyboxification—grunge for the rich. Still, platform companies position themselves as experiential, de-centralized, proamateur, and crowd-based. There is an overarching ethos of
newness, innovation, and empowerment.
This play between exclusive and for-the-masses, amateur
and professional, retro and new are all at the core of what the
platform is selling. Whether or not any one descriptive feature
reflects the realities of platform companies is not insignificant,
but it is not the whole inquiry. The consumption experience itself matters. Moreover, the realities of the platform economy
will continue to be shaped, in part, by how closely governments
regulate them in relation to regulated industry competitors. In
other words, the framework itself is unstable and normatively
dependent on the answers we provide as legal theorists and
policymakers.

104. See generally RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE IS
YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010) (tracing the development of the sharing economy and the motivations behind it).
105. Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Skyboxification of American Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
michael-sandel/what-money-cant-buy_b_1442128.html (last updated June 20,
2012).
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III. CONTESTED GROUNDS OF THE PLATFORM: OWN NO
EVIL, EMPLOY NO EVIL, DIRECT NO EVIL
A. LAW AS ENABLER AND INHIBITOR
Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been fueled by outdated reg106
ulation. –Rafi Mohammed, Harvard Business Review
There were laws created for businesses, and there were laws for people. What the sharing economy did was create a third category: peo107
ple as businesses. –Brian Chesky, co-founder, Airbnb
Some are sad. And some are glad. And some are very, very bad. –Dr.
108
Seuss

It is an age-old debate. Does law aid or hinder innovation?
New technologies present new opportunities and new challenges for regulation. The rise of the platform adds new types of
risk, implicating liability laws, consumer protection laws, insurance laws, employment and labor laws, and property and
zoning laws. But they also provide new ways to address some of
the very same social goals that law has attempted to reach. We
are accustomed to thinking in terms of a new industry followed
by a new set of regulations, but market innovation also offers
an opportunity for more foundational thinking about the role of
regulation. New economic models push for new legal processes.
The platform economy has introduced innovation in services,
entrepreneurship, and the way we work. When manufacturing
rose in the industrial era, New Dealers added new regulations,
such as safety standards for the auto industry. During the era
of the Great Society, trans-industry agencies including OSHA
and the EPA were formed, introducing further regulations, of109
ten built on and adopted from industry self-standards. In cycles of both financial crisis and technological leaps, markets
readjust, new types of transactions are introduced, and in turn
new forms of regulation are adopted. Even beyond external
economic and social forces, in considering the law as a more
closed system, scholars have observed repeated internal cyclical

106. Mohammed, supra note 91.
107. Andy Kessler, Brian Chesky: The ‘Sharing Economy’ and Its Enemies,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
4049704579321001856708992.
108. DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH, TWO FISH, RED FISH, BLUE FISH 6–7 (1988).
109. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 415
(2004).
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conversions between over- and under-regulation, especially
110
when disruptive business models are introduced.
The goals of regulation are multiple. Regulation can involve correction of market failures and incentivization of competition. Regulation can be designed to address public safety,
quality control, privacy, access, equality, fairness, and distributional concerns. All regulations are presumed to enhance the
public welfare, but a realistic understanding of regulation in
action is that not all regulation is equally situated in this regard. Public choice theory and regulatory capture help explain
111
barriers to entry that do not contribute to overall welfare.
Other regulations are simply outdated, and based on incorrect
economic and scientific presumptions, or their goals are otherwise achievable through more efficient and accurate means.
The regulatory questions raised by the rapid rise of the
platform are expansive. They span the entire map of the legal
world, including work, tax, safety and health, quality and consumer protection, intellectual property, zoning, and antidiscrimination. The following Section identifies clusters of
regulatory logic. The platform economy pushes us to look at the
world of regulation with fresh eyes and to analyze regulatory
requirements with these categories in mind. Laws that do not
promote welfare but rather protect entrenched interests are
easy cases. On this end of the spectrum, the Article identifies
many permitting and licensing laws as well as price controls.
Tax laws are a similarly easy case because these laws continue
along the same logic as in the pre-platform offline market. The
hardest cases are regulations that are about fairness, externalities, and normative preferences in a democratic process. These
include consumer protection laws, quality and safety controls,
zoning laws, employment laws, and intellectual property laws.
B. EASY CASES: COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The traditional way is you can’t do it unless you get a license. That
made sense up until we had data. Now the starting point is yes.
112
–Nick Grossman, Union Square Ventures

1. Permitting
There are regulations that enhance public welfare and
there are those that enhance the interests of lobbyists, rent110. See id. at 367.
111. See generally id.
112. Stein, supra note 18.
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In the transportation
seekers, and entrenched interests.
market, the taxi industry has claimed that Uber, Lyft, and other transportation platform companies circumvent the regulations and licensing fees with which taxicab companies must
contend. In February 2015, the Broward County Commission in
Florida voted to regulate ride-sharing services the same way
114
taxis are regulated. As a result, Uber and Lyft will be re115
quired to obtain the same certificates as taxis and limousines.
In 2014, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission held separate hearings for Lyft and Uber to decide whether the companies should be granted permanent licenses to operate
116
statewide. Similar hearings are underway around the country
and across the world. In other states, like Texas, Uber and other ride-sharing services have been essentially shut out by rules
governing limo services that restrict charging riders based on
117
time elapsed or distance traveled.
At the federal level, Senate Bill 1457 was introduced by
Senator Wayne Fontana in 2014 to create a new category of a
transportation company, offering legal status for ride-sharing
118
companies. Such an effort rejects the application of the stringent permitting requirements imposed on traditional transportation industries and looks at the platform as a new emerging
market. Similarly, in California, the Public Utilities Commission reached an agreement to allow ride-sharing companies to
operate while it weighs proposals that would make them fullfledged, legally operating “transportation network compa-

113. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (developing the concept of capture theory); see
also Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1987) (discussing “how politicians reap returns first by threatening and then by forbearing from extracting private rents already in existence”).
114. Celia Ampel, Broward County Votes To Regulate Uber, Lyft as Taxi
Services, BUS. J. (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/
news/2015/02/10/broward-county-votes-to-regulate-uber-lyft-as-taxi.html.
115. Id.
116. Motor Carriers, PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/
consumer_info/transportation/motor_carrier/applications.aspx (last visited
Oct. 14, 2016).
117. See Aman Batheja, Austin Council Approves Stricter Rules for Uber,
Lyft, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/12/17/
austin-city-council-approves-new-uber-regs-uber-th.
118. Kim Lyons, PUC Chairman, Commissioners Support Fontana Legislation for Lyft, Uber, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.postgazette.com/business/2014/09/09/PUC-chairman-commissioners/stories/
201409090082.
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nies.” This new category would not be regulated identically to
taxis but rather would likely involve state licensing, required
criminal background checks on drivers, and mandatory insurance coverage more stringent than that required of limo companies. In general, Uber is encouraged in some jurisdictions,
including California, Oregon, and Washington, but was initially
banned in Nevada, Boise, Brussels, and Berlin, followed by a
120
nationwide ban in Germany.
Attempts at extending permit requirements—what industry interests often call “leveling the playing field” between ridesharing companies and taxi companies, or between other platform companies and the businesses they disrupt—are generally
harmful to the evolution of the platform and to competitive
markets more broadly. Under capture theory, industry players
extract rent from special permitting, licensing, and other regu121
latory requirements. By designing around these regulatory
rents, platform businesses create value for consumers as well
as push incumbents to become more efficient and responsive in
novel ways. Requiring taxicab medallions is a paradigmatic example of rents. Here is a striking statistic: in the mid-2000s,
there were only 12,779 licensed taxicabs in New York City
compared with 21,000 in 1931 when the city had a million few122
er inhabitants. Limited grants of permits, especially coupled
with regulations such as all transportation cars having to be of
the same color (yellow cabs), dramatically reduce incentives
and access to compete. While consumers largely benefit from

119. See Tomio Geron, California Becomes First State To Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-to
-regulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx/#20169cff67fe; Heather Somerville, California Public Utilities Commission Probes Uber’s Car-Leasing Program, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/business/
20150812/california-public-utilities-commission-probes-ubers-car-leasing
-program.
120. Zach Kyle, Uber Defies Boise, Starts Charging, IDAHO STATESMAN
(Dec. 31, 2014); see also Tracey Lien, Uber Gets Big Win in Nevada as Legislature OKs Bill Authorizing Service, UberX, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-nevada-20150528-story.html;
Kevin
Rawlinson, Uber Service ‘Banned’ in Germany by Frankfurt Court, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29027803.
121. See Stigler, supra note 113, at 5 (outlining capture theory and industry desire to regulate); see also Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213–14 (1976); Steven C. Salop & David T.
Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267–68 (1983).
122. SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB FACT BOOK
(2006), http://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/taxifb.pdf.
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requiring platform transportation companies to have similar
safety and insurance standards as taxis, the same is not true
123
about restrictions on prices, routes, and entry. Instead of
permitting, regulators should consider direct regulation of the
benefits. This is the model that California regulators seem to be
124
following. If risk reduction is the underlying reason for permit requirements, then technology companies could be deemed
liable for accidents and therefore required to provide insurance.
As we shall see, there are many other paths to directly increase
safety without imposing permit requirements.
2. Occupational Licensing
A few decades ago, only five percent of jobs required a li125
cense. Now nearly one-third of all jobs require some sort of
licensing. Some professional services were historically subject
126
to licensing, such as the law bar and medical boards. More
recently, occupational licensing has been extended to such lowskill jobs as hairdressers, manicurists, and restaurant workers.
As one group of economists have recently stated: “Occupational
licensing has been abused by incumbent market participants to
exclude rivals, often in unreasonable ways, and to raise prices.
This disturbing trend already costs consumers billions of dol127
lars every year and impedes job growth . . . .”
In July 2015, the White House issued a report prepared by
the Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, the
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor
128
regarding occupational licensing. The report similarly notes
that “[m]ore than one-quarter of U.S. workers now require a
123. Taxi Competition, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS. (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?
SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7; see also Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit
Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 232 (2014) (suggesting that the paperwork
and permitting that seem appropriate for a large-scale, centralized business
focused on taxi services are a mismatch with the compliance capabilities of
individual drivers, proposing instead that general permits might be a useful
model, lowering compliance costs while minimizing the harm to the public).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 119–23.
125. Stein, supra note 18.
126. Id.
127. Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 2, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2014) (No. 13534).
128. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (2015), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf.
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license to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed by
129
the States.” The report warns that while some licensing is
designed to provide safety and professionalism,
The current licensing regime in the United States also creates substantial costs, and often the requirements for obtaining a license are
not in sync with the skills needed for the job. There is evidence that
licensing requirements raise the price of goods and services, restrict
employment opportunities, and make it more difficult for workers to
take their skills across State lines. Too often, policymakers do not
carefully weigh these costs and benefits when making decisions about
130
whether or how to regulate a profession through licensing.

The effects of the accelerated rise in occupational licensing
to jobs traditionally open to all workers are anti-competitive
131
and regressive, which negatively impact new entry. Permitting and licensing requirements, price controls, and threshold
132
entry standards are all ex-ante barriers. Like with permitting, ex-post regulations that directly address safety and liability are generally preferable and more conducive to new entry.
Ex-post regulations include insurance systems and tort and
product liability laws.
3. Rate Fixing
In February 2015, the City of Orlando passed an ordinance
requiring ride-sharing companies to charge the same rate as
133
taxis, $2.40 a mile. In general, taxicabs are regulated not only
through medallion licensing requirements, which are expensive
and hard to get, but also by the rates taxis may charge passen134
gers.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id.
131. Veronique de Rugy, Occupational Licensing: Bad for Competition, Bad
for Low-Income Workers, MERCATUS CTR., GEO. MASON U. (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.mercatus.org/publication/occupational-licensing-bad-competition
-bad-low-income-workers.
132. See Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need To Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/
10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the
-sharing-economy (discussing new models of regulation that developed out of
the electronic marketplace).
133. Stephen Hudak, Uber Vows To Pay Drivers’ Fines as Orlando Regulations Kick In, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.orlandosentinel
.com/news/breaking-news/os-uber-orlando-fight-20150202-story.html (noting
that Uber has said that it will pay fines of drivers in Orlando).
134. Mohammed, supra note 91 (“Local governments need to understand
that consumers view ride sharing services like Uber as close substitutes to
taxis. Regulators are doing its residents an injustice by regulating taxi prices
(consumers would benefit from a taxi vs. Uber price war)—and in the process
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A great innovation of the platform, achieved primarily by
technological advancement, is accuracy in linking pricing to
supply and demand. As a recent article in the MIT Technology
Review argues, “Dynamic pricing is the future, even if the road
135
to get there will be bumpy.” Uber’s dynamic pricing, though
received with hostility by the media, is designed for more than
maximizing profits in the face of increased demand, which most
companies, for example the airline industry, do in the face of
136
fixed supply. Rather, because of the nature of the platform,
Uber’s surge pricing also operates to increase supply: more
drivers turn on their Uber app when they see that the rates
have increased. Uber reports that supply of drivers increases
by seventy to eighty percent when surge pricing is introduced,
and more importantly, it eliminates two-thirds of unfulfilled
requests, which demonstrates the magic of the platform econo137
my: supply, as well as demand, is highly elastic. This is a
fundamentally responsive market-perfecting model:
Dynamic pricing changes are driven algorithmically when wait times
are increasing dramatically, and “unfulfilled requests” start to rise. In
essence, there are two functions of the increased price model. One is
to increase supply. The second function of the price increase is to
temporarily intentionally reduce demand. Through these two mechanisms, the company is able to (a) increase supply, (b) assure reliability, a key tenet of the company, and (c) maximize the number of com138
pleted rides.

While economically sound, the technological innovation of
dynamic pricing is nonetheless largely in tension with regulatory schemes. Many states have anti-gouging laws that prevent
sellers of goods or services from raising prices during times of
increased demand, such as after a natural disaster. California
limits price increases by retailers after an emergency to ten
percent. The goal of anti-gouging laws in this case is to create
fairness during times of extreme strife. But when the goal is
simply to subvert the market effects of short-term volatility in

unwittingly fueling Uber’s growth and enriching its stockholders.”).
135. James Surowiecki, In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging, MIT TECH.
REV. (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/529961/in-praise-of
-efficient-price-gouging.
136. Id. (explaining that airlines’ fixed supply led them to institute dynamic pricing that encouraged patrons to book early).
137. Bill Gurley, A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model, ABOVE
THE CROWD (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.abovethecrowd.com/2014/03/11/a
-deeper-look-at-ubers-dynamic-pricing-model.
138. Id.
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supply and demand, anti-gouging laws are distortive and counter-productive.
4. Tax Collection
A primary concern of local regulators involves whether the
platform economy should be taxed at the same levels as competing industries. A central issue for Airbnb has been the question of hotel tax. Airbnb recently paid $25 million in hotel taxes
to the city of San Francisco as backpay to account for the past
139
Other cities have started to demand rentseveral years.
140
sharing hosts pay taxes. For example, New York and Portland
require people who rent their homes to add local hotel taxes to
141
visitors’ bills. San Diego requires anyone who owns, operates,
or manages rental properties to charge rental unit business
taxes. This includes hotels, motels, and any property that is
142
advertised or rented during the calendar year.
Airbnb claims that it benefits cities in multiple ways. First,
Airbnb claims it can collect millions in hotel occupancy taxes
this year, and the number would continue to increase each
year. Moreover, Airbnb claims that the platform generates multiple millions of dollars more in economic activity in cities in
which it has listings. When renters stay at an Airbnb location,
they are often staying in local neighborhoods, eating at local
143
restaurants, and shopping at local vendors.
Tax law is an easy case because it is designed to collect a
percentage of profit from economic activities wherever the
transactions were generated. The questions of collection are
largely technical and require adaptation to new forms of deal144
ing. For pragmatic purposes, it may make sense to make the
139. Patrick Hoge, Airbnb Says It Has Paid Back Taxes to San Francisco,
S.F. BUS. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/
2015/02/airbnb-paid-back-hotel-taxes-san-francisco.html.
140. E.g., Amina Elahi, Airbnb To Begin Collecting Chicago Hotel Tax Feb.
15, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2015) http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/
originals/chi-airbnb-chicago-taxes-bsi-20150130-story.html.
141. Alan Pentico, Don’t Take a Vacation from Subletting Rules, SAN
DIEGO SOURCE (June 16, 2014), http://www.sddt.com/Commentary/article
.cfm?SourceCode=20140616tza&Commentary_ID=272&_t=Dont+take+a+
vacation+from+subletting+rules%23.VPAfZEvBFuY.
142. Id.
143. Tim Logan, As L.A. Weighs Regulation, Airbnb Touts Its Economic
Impact in City, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la
-fi-airbnb-touts-its-impact-in-la-20141203-story.html (reporting Airbnb’s estimated total economic impact in L.A. at $312 million in 2014).
144. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transpor-
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platform provider, rather than individual user, responsible for
tax collection based on convenience and efficiency. Effectively,
under current definitions, for the enterprise to avoid falling
under the pertinent state regulatory scheme, the provider must
be considered a pure broker of information rather than one of
145
goods or services. This avoids defining the enterprise in a
manner that makes state regulation applicable (i.e., Airbnb
doesn’t provide hotel rooms; rather, it provides information to
prospective guests and advertisements for hosts). In requiring
the provider to collect and pay taxes derived directly from the
end consumer, the state could be seen as implying that the
platform provider is in fact the service provider, with the agent
at the point of sale an employee. However, regardless of potential implications to the harder questions of liability, consumer
protection laws, and employment protection laws, tax collection
by the platform company may well be the most adequate and
practical solution. As such, platform companies can become
regulatory facilitators using their technological capacities to
collect, as well as provide audited evidence of compliance in the
era of decentralized peer-to-peer transactions. Importantly, the
question of tax collection should thus be delinked from the definitional questions embedded in other bodies of law discussed
below. Indeed, one insight emerging from a fresh look at the
innovation-regulation framework mandated by the platform
economy is that, rather than lumping all regulatory questions
together and attempting to answer them as one, different regulatory bodies should be examined separately and with pur146
pose.

tation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69
(2015); see also Martin Sullivan, Tax Challenges for the Uber Economy,
FORBES (July 4, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/07/14/tax
-challenges-for-the-uber-economy.
145. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 989, 1032–34 (2016); Mitch Lipka, How the Sharing Economy Makes Tax
Filing Tougher, TIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.time.com/3822148/sharing
-economy-taxes-uber-lyft.
146. See generally Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb's Woes Show How Far the Sharing Economy Has Come, TIME (Oct. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/
07/airbnbs-woes-show-how-far-the-sharing-economy-has-come (describing the
benefits of treating short term rental services, such as Airbnb, differently than
rideshare services, such as Uber and Lyft).
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C. HARD CASES: PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE PLATFORM
1. The Experience Economy: Does Airbnb Violate Zoning
Laws?
City officials fear lodging platform companies like Airbnb
147
will negatively affect residential life. While some cities are
attempting to limit the lodging platform, others cities are
changing their zoning laws to increase certainty and enable the
148
rise of new lodge-sharing models. Zoning laws have multiple
purposes. They attempt to keep residential areas quiet, clean,
and safe, all of which can be at risk when increasing the num149
ber of transient users in these areas. They also may be designed to increase a sense of neighborhood community and local
150
familiarity. Zoning laws can also have population planning
goals such as rent stabilization and an increase in the availa151
bility of affordable housing for students.
On February 1, 2015, a new city ordinance took effect in
San Francisco that regulates vacation rentals in private
152
homes. The law legalizes vacation rentals in private homes
and restricts them to permanent residents who must register in
153
person with the city’s planning department. Additionally, vacation rentals are limited to ninety days a year for entire-home
154
rentals. Previously, residential rentals of less than thirty
155
days were illegal, though the rule was only loosely enforced.
147. See generally Julie Bort, San Francisco Makes Airbnb Legal at Last,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco
-makes-airbnb-legal-at-last-2014-10 (discussing how local legislatures are responding to the growing popularity of services such as Airbnb).
148. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 931–34 (2015) (describing the range of local legislative responses to lodging platform companies).
149. Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. REG.
91, 115–17 (2011) (detailing the progression of how zoning laws have been
addressed, interpreted, and justified by various federal courts).
150. Id.
151. For examples of how zoning laws achieve these ends, see Rolf Pendall,
From Hurdles to Bridges: Local Land-Use Regulations and the Pursuit of Affordable Rental Housing, JOINT CTR. HOUSING STUD. HARV. U., 4–5 (2007).
152. Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F.
PLAN. DEP'T, http://www.sf-planning.org/office-short-term-rental-registry-faqs
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
153. Id.
154. Id. This 90-day limit only applies when the owner of the home is not
present during the time that the guests are renting the property.
155. Bort, supra note 147.
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The law is not only designed to allow short-term private rentals
but also to dissuade non-locals from buying San Francisco
156
properties strictly for the business of short-term rentals. A
housing shortage in San Francisco influenced the latter restriction, such that the law will keep San Francisco homes
157
Although the law has
available for permanent residents.
barely taken effect, many are already seeking tighter regulation of the lodging platform, such as an amendment that would
allow affordable housing nonprofits to directly sue private hosts
158
who break the law.
Others are advocating new legislation that “would create
new insurance requirements for tenants who proceed with con159
verting their residence into a vacation rental.” The insurance
would be “similar to what is offered to lodging and bed and
breakfast companies, removing a landlord’s liability for person160
al injury and property damage done by a subletter.” Other
local lawmakers, in cities such as San Diego, are pushing for
legislation that would maintain zoning laws and the preplatform “stable and familiar feel of many residential neigh161
borhoods.” Airbnb has been deemed in some legal disputes
around the country to violate local hospitality regulations, condominium board rules, and other limitations on short-term
162
housing usage. Criticism of Airbnb comes from many directions: angry hosts who found themselves the subjects of fines
156. See generally Mayor Lee Announces New “One-Stop Shop” Office of
Short-Term Rental Administration & Enforcement, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F.
PLAN. DEP'T (July 2, 2015), http://www.sfmayor.org/article/mayor-lee
-announces-new-“one-stop-shop”-office-short-term-rental-administration
-enforcement.
157. See generally Kopytoff, supra note 146 (stating that Airbnb's “rentals
also take affordable housing off the market”).
158. Allen Young, State Legislation Could Hit Airbnb, Other Rental Sharing Services with New Rules, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www
.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2015/02/24/state-legislation-could-hit
-airbnb-other-rental.html.
159. Id.; see also Emily Pedersen, City Rent Board To Investigate Legality,
Effects of Airbnb on City Housing, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Feb. 23, 2015), http://
www.dailycal.org/2015/02/23/city-rent-board-investigate-legality-effects-airbnb
-city-housing.
160. Young, supra note 158.
161. Hugo Martin, L.A. To Consider Regulating Airbnb and Other ShortTerm Home Rentals, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-regulating-short-term-home-rentals-20141202-story.html.
162. Ron Klain, Airbnb’s Biggest Disruption: America’s Laws, FORTUNE
(Sept.
10,
2014),
http://www.fortune.com/2014/09/10/airbnbs-biggest
-disruption-americas-laws (discussing various legal responses to emerging
technologies).
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and eviction notices as well as city officials who have received
complaints from neighborhoods where disrespectful renters
163
wreaked havoc. The safety, property value, and quality of life
sentiments reverberate across local debates.
Compared to San Francisco, New York has been more re164
sistant to the expansion of the lodging platform. New York
law prohibits private owners from renting out their apartments
165
for short periods unless they are living in the property. In
fact, New York City residential zoning and rent control laws
166
render nearly half of Airbnb rentals unlawful. In 2015, a New
York judge upheld a landlord’s decision to evict a tenant who
was caught leasing out his apartment for more than twice what
167
he was paying his landlord. In particular, New York officials
have been searching for illegal hotels in people who rent multiple units on the Airbnb site. New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman has subpoenaed Airbnb for information regarding 225,000 landlords, alleging that “as many as 75 percent of
rentals on Airbnb are illegal under current [New York] law
168
. . . .” Schneiderman has also attempted to get the company to
169
shut down illegal hotels that have been developed by hosts.
In an attempt to cooperate with officials to identify hosts who
operate de facto hotels rather than temporarily renting out
their homes, Airbnb reported 124 hosts to the state attorney’s
170
office that Airbnb found to have multiple listings on the site.
David Hantman, the Global Head of Public Policy for Airbnb,
provided New York with suggested regulations that would stop
171
these de facto illegal commercial hotels. Hantman suggests
that first, the city should create tougher penalties for unlicensed hotel operators and amendments that protect regular
163. Pentico, supra note 141.
164. Kopytoff, supra note 146.
165. Cf. Ryan Lawler, As It Seeks New Regulations in NY, Airbnb Estimates It Would Collect $65 Million in Taxes There, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 16,
2015), https://www.techcrunch.com/2015/01/16/airbnb-65-million-in-ny (explaining current legal restrictions and advocating a new, broader approach).
166. Jason Clampet, Airbnb’s Growing Pains Mirrored in New York City,
Where Half Its Listings Are Illegal Rentals, SKIFT (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www
.skift.com/2013/01/07/airbnbs-growing-pains-mirrored-in-new-york-city-where
-half-its-listings-are-illegal-rentals.
167. Julia Marsh, Rent-Stabilized Tenant Evicted After Cashing in on
Airbnb, N.Y. POST (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.nypost.com/2015/02/20/rent
-stabilized-tenants-who-peddle-their-pads-may-be-evicted.
168. Lawler, supra note 165.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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New Yorkers who want to share their homes. Second, the law
should be amended to allow owners to share space only in the
173
home in which they live. Third, Airbnb has offered to pay for
hosts’ hotel and tourist taxes, providing New York with $65
million that can be used to fund public services in the city, in174
cluding increasing enforcement activity against illegal hotels.
A final suggestion has been that regulations should prohibit
residents from making more money through home sharing than
175
they pay in rent each month.
Rejecting the New York approach and embracing similar
reforms as in California, the United Kingdom “announced plans
176
to remove laws controlling short-term rentals . . . .” France
177
too has legalized short-term rentals of primary residences.
Other international cities are accepting Airbnb but imposing
various regulatory controls, such as Amsterdam and Berlin.
Amsterdam allows residents to rent out their homes for up to
178
two months of the year to up to four people at a time. Other
global cities are reacting similarly to New York, such as Berlin
and Barcelona, which have imposed increased restrictions on
179
the operation of Airbnb.
The wisdom emerging from these recent developments and
heated debates about the legality of the vast lodging platform is
that regulatory controls are often a matter of legitimate social
trade-offs and emphasize certain values. The residential nature
of a city, the spread of affordable housing, the perceived and
actual safety inherent in transient lodging are all questions
that must be answered through the democratic process. These
are hard questions because there is no one right answer. Most
of the time, each choice involves preferring one social value
over another. At the same time, the debates need to be based on
facts rather than perceptions. Are jurisdictions that support the
spread of the lodging platform more prone to safety issues? If
so, can insurance, rather than zoning controls, address these
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Gill Carson, Five Key Sharing Economy Sectors Could Generate £9
Billion of UK Revenues by 2025, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://www.pwc.blogs.com/press_room/2014/08/five-key-sharing-economy
-sectors-could-generate-9-billion-of-uk-revenues-by-2025.html.
177. Johanna Interian, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy
Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. L. REV. 129, 144 (2016).
178. Id. at 145.
179. Id. at 145–46.
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concerns? Using classic economics terminology, does Airbnb
create more negative than positive externalities? Does the potential noise of temporary lodgers endured by resident neighbors outweigh the benefits of increased commercial activity in
the neighborhood and affordable tourism overall? From an equity perspective, are jurisdictions that allow short-term rentals
pricing the poor out of their neighborhoods? If so, can direct
affordable housing solutions such as tax subsidies or new development projects better address these concerns?
These are questions that can only be answered over time,
with data and analysis, and the balance will likely be struck
180
differently in different communities. As the platform economy
rapidly grows, many companies are running up against regulatory hurdles. As thousands of companies have transformed
many aspects of our lives as consumers, workers, and citizens,
the lines we drew through regulation are now being redrawn.
The fluidity between home/hotel, ownership/loan, work/gig, and
individual/business presents a challenge to policy makers. The
hard questions that have always been at the core of regulation
continue over to new business models. The problem is that
many of the values we desire to promote as lawmakers—
freedom, equality, choice, fairness, and welfare—are not only in
181
tension but also incommensurable. However, ideally, lawmakers should attempt to resolve these competing values with
more fine-tuned solutions, such as targeted risk regulation, rather than direct blanket prohibitions.
2. The Gig Economy: Does Uber Violate Employment Laws?
Can you imagine if this turns into a Mechanical Turk economy, where
everyone is doing piecework at all odd hours, and no one knows when
the next job will come, and how much it will pay? What kind of private lives can we possibly have, what kind of relationships, what kind
182
of families? –Robert Reich

180. In a related area, some localities have updated their city ordinances to
allow temporary dining. Others already have different types of permits that
allow non-restaurant commercial dining, such as catering licenses. Schindler,
supra note 53; Memorandum from Rajiv Bhatia, Dir. Envtl. Health, S.F. Dep't
Pub. Health to the Food Safety Program Staff (Nov. 18, 2011), https://www
.sfdph.org/dph/files/EHSdocs/ehsFood/PopUpGuidelines.pdf.
181. See generally Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998) (discussing the
problem of incommensurability and analyzing solutions).
182. Farhad Manjoo, Uber’s Business Model Could Change Your Work, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/
personaltech/uber-a-rising-business-model.html.
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From the perspective of labor market shifts, commentators
worry that absent regulatory controls, the platform will lead
work to be so app-driven that the internal logic of full-time em183
ployment, job security, and worker rights will collapse. The
more labor there is in supply, the cheaper the pay, or put differently, “the more humans are fungible; that is one human can
replace another and do whatever that person is doing, the less
184
they have value.” A leading critic of what is termed “the gig
economy,” economist Robert Reich argues that the rise of platform companies is making work life unpredictable, insecure,
185
and, ironically, not even profitable. Based on interviews of
platform workers, Reich “has concluded that ‘most would much
186
rather have good, well-paying, regular jobs.’”
The concerns about the nature of employment in the twenty-first century, while valid and significant, are largely misdirected. The rise of the contingent workforce precedes the rise of
the platform. The contingent workforce now constitutes more
than one-third of all employees with predictions that it will rise
187
to nearly half of the workforce by 2020. Given these realities,
the question of whether one would rather have a high-paying
stable job offline or a part-time job is misleading. The contrast
should be to other available work options, whether enabled by
the platform or not. With that comparison in mind, a new study
by Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger mines through Uber
data in order to analyze the work-life realities of Uber driv188
ers. The Krueger report finds that on average, Uber drivers
work fewer hours and earn more per hour than traditional taxi
189
drivers, even after accounting for their expenses. Moreover,
most Uber drivers are employed full- or part-time elsewhere
190
and work for Uber for additional income.

183. See generally Freeman, supra note 12.
184. Ian Welsh, Why the Sharing Economy Is Destroying Prosperity, IAN
WELSH (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.ianwelsh.net/why-the-sharing-economy-is
-destroying-prosperity.
185. Manjoo, supra note 182.
186. Id.
187. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market
for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States (Princeton Univ. Indust. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 587, 2015).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 19, 23. For a critique of this study's methodology due to its failure to fully consider the costs associated with using one's own car as an Uber
driver, see Ubernomics, CTR. FOR ECON. & PUB. POL'Y (Jan. 23, 2015), http://
www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/beat-the-press/ubernomics.
190. Hall & Krueger, supra note 187, at 10.
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At the same time, similar to many jobs, platform work
raises questions about the nature of the relationship between
the providers—drivers, cleaners, hosts, chefs, dog walkers, personal assistants—and the platform company. With definitional
determinations comes legal responsibility. Many platform companies—from the grocery delivery service Instacart to the courier service Postmates—involve people working in time frames
and ways that posit a challenge to traditional modes of employment. The employment status of the providers on these
companies remains uncertain. For example, Handy is a cleaning service, but unlike local cleaning franchises before it, it digitally and directly connects customer with a cleaner and takes a
191
fifteen percent commission of every hour worked. Handy clas192
sifies its cleaners as independent contractors. Handy cleaners
recently brought a class action lawsuit alleging that Handy
193
misclassifies them. The cleaners seek recognition of their status as employees and, consequently, compensation for missed
lunch breaks, minimum wage compensation, reimbursement
194
for business expenses, and overtime. Handy has argued that
its users “choose the Handy platform because it provides much
needed flexibility by allowing them to book whatever jobs best
195
suit them.” In the company’s terms of service, when referring
to its cleaners, it includes at least five repetitions of an agreement that they are independent contractors rather than employees, perhaps hoping repetition can replace solid legal ar196
gument.
The highest profile battles involve platform drivers. As we
have seen, Uber asserts that it is only a software technology
company, which provides a smart phone application that
197
matches ride-seekers with drivers. Uber subsequently maintains that it
does not employ drivers, own vehicles or otherwise control the means
and methods by which a driver chooses to connect with riders . . . it
merely provides a platform for people who own vehicles to leverage
their skills and personal assets and connect with other people looking
198
to pay for those skills and assets.
191. Kessler, supra note 17.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031,
at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014).
198. Id.
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While both Uber and Lyft have been firm in classifying
their drivers as independent contractors, others have viewed
the arrangement differently. Recent class action suits brought
against both companies by drivers claiming misclassification
stress the degree of control and direction the companies exercise. In the Uber lawsuits, plaintiffs claim that, while drivers
decide when to turn on the app to get notifications about ride
requests, drivers “must respond to assignments generated by
the Uber computer system ‘within seconds’ or they will lose the
199
job.” Further, Uber sets the pickup time, the passenger pay
rate, the method of pay, and which passengers the drivers must
200
pick up. The payment goes to a centralized account set up by
201
Uber. Uber has responded with other factors that support an
independent contractor relationship: its drivers supply the instrumentalities of their work (the cars), are paid by the job, and
control their work hours, their geographic area for pickups, and
202
whether to accept a passenger’s request for a ride. While
Uber drivers own the vehicle and smartphones with the required GPS, in some instances Uber provides these phones and
assists drivers in securing leases for vehicles. In preliminary
hearings in one such lawsuit, Judge Edward Chen stated, “The
idea that Uber is simply a software platform, I don’t find that a
203
very persuasive argument.” Chen found that the fact that
“Uber sets the rates by which drivers are paid, screens them
. . . and can terminate them” weighs in favor of finding them to
204
be employees. In a parallel case against Lyft, the court stated, “[P]eople who do the kinds of things that Lyft drivers do
205
here are employees.” In June 2015, the California Labor
Commissioner, citing the high degree of control Uber exercises
over its drivers, ruled in an individual hearing that at least one
206
driver of Uber was an employee. In December 2015, a Cali199. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG,
2014 WL 1338148, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014).
200. Id.
201. See id. For an example of how courts have approached the question of
how overlapping taxi service contracts impact the restrictive financial obligations of their parent companies, see generally Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 98 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 568 (2009).
202. See Karen Gullo, Uber and Lyft Drivers May Have Employee Status,
Judge Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-01-30/uber-drivers-may-have-employee-status-judge-says.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Pringle, supra note 17.
206. Lauren Weber & Douglas MacMillan, Uber Driver Was Employee, Not
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fornia court issued a final order certifying the Uber drivers case
207
as a class action with trial set for June 2016. However, that
trial now may not go forth. In April 2016, the plaintiffs filed a
208
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement with Uber,
209
which was denied. The proposed settlement had two primary
components: a $100 million payment, and promises to address
210
the most problematic areas of Uber’s business practices.
Among those changes were the following: a clarified process for
deactivating drivers, as well as a way for drivers to appeal their
deactivation; a “Driver Association” comprised of elected drivers that Uber agrees to meet with quarterly; and a promise to
make good-faith efforts to informs riders that tips, though not
211
required or expected, are not included in the fare. The settlement would not have required Uber to reclassify drivers as
employees so it leaves the question unsettled and could allow
212
for new litigation of more groups of drivers in the future.
Lyft, like Uber, moved to settle its own class action in
April, offering a $12.25 million settlement and agreeing to remove its at-will termination provision; instead, Lyft will only
terminate drivers for specific, listed reasons and offer them a
213
grace period to fix the problem. However, the judge denied
that motion on the grounds the settlement amount was unreasonably low, giving Lyft and the plaintiffs until May to negoti214
ate a new settlement consistent with his findings. In June
Contractor, California Commission Says, WALL ST. J. (last updated June 17,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-driver-was-employee-not-contractor
-california-commission-says-1434557958.
207. UBER DRIVERS, http://www.uberlawsuit.com (last visited Oct. 14,
2016).
208. Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Approval and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 1, O'Connor v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-03826 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21 2016), ECF No. 516-3 [hereinafter Motion, O’Connor].
209. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL
4398271, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (denying motion for preliminary
approval); UBER, supra note 207.
210. O'Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4–6.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Notice of Motion and Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement at 1, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 26, 2016), ECF No. 169 (noting a settlement agreement with Lyft as Exhibit 1 of the document).
214. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 20–21, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7,
2016), ECF No. 200.

2016]

LAW OF THE PLATFORM

135

2016, the judge granted preliminary approval to a $27-million
215
settlement.
While these mushrooming lawsuits are important, the employment law issues are hardly unique to the platform. Nearly
a century after the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
uncertainty about the boundaries between covered employees
and independent contractors is as high as ever. Indeed, the
question of employee classification has been recognized as one
of the most difficult and blurry judicial line-drawing techniques
216
in the world of law. Recently, FedEx lost several class action
suits that alleged misclassification of its drivers as independent
contractors. In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems
Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx held “all necessary
217
control” over its drivers. Taxi drivers themselves, operating
under the conventional pre-platform model, have similarly
fought over their employment status. In Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.,
the plaintiffs sought class certification of one hundred taxi
drivers arguing companies misclassified them as independent
contractors with respect to wage and hour law provisions of the
California Labor Code and that, in turn, they were eligible for
218
workers’ compensation insurance. The court denied certification, holding that there was not enough commonality and
raised questions about whether drivers fit under the common
219
law test of an employee. The court pointed to the fact that
taxi drivers had provided equipment, including cell phones,
GPS, and credit card machines, and that some of the taxi drivers advertised their services via the Internet, telephone yellow
220
pages, and business cards. These are very similar context221
specific factors considered by the Uber class action court. In
effect, these battles over employment status online and offline
are virtually identical. They have to do with the challenge of
line-drawing using multi-factor, common law tests that are of215. Tracey Lien, Judge Approves Lyft’s $27-Million Class-Action Settlement with Drivers, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-approval-20160623-snap-story
.html.
216. Cf. Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539
(2006) (arguing that work law has many substantive and historical layers
making categorization difficult).
217. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 991, 997
(9th Cir. 2014).
218. Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 572 (2009).
219. Id. at 579–84.
220. Id. at 581.
221. See Motion, O’Connor, supra note 208.

136

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:87

ten outdated due to new patterns of work and production. Put
differently, the problem is not work via the platform, but rather
the legal definition itself, which is inherently complex.
Contemporary realities may necessitate extending protections we find valuable as a society—dignity and antidiscrimination principles, whistleblowing protections, insurance and portable benefits, and occupational health and safety—to all laborers regardless of their employment status. Rather than insisting on archaic binary definitions of employee
versus independent contractor, creative proposals consider a
222
third category of “dependent contractor.” Former Chairwoman of the National Labor Relations Board, Wilma Liebman, has
suggested such a category in a dissenting opinion of the NLRB,
noting that “Canada and Germany have statutes protecting
223
such workers.” Liebman stated, “Some people are clearly independent contractors and some are clearly employees, but a
third category becomes necessary when you have people who
are borderline,” while being economically dependent on one
224
employer. Again, these questions are challenging but not
unique to the platform. As part of the democratic process, each
society strikes a balance between freedom of contract and employment protections, fairness, and welfare. The normative
values embedded in these choices and their economic consequences present difficult challenges. They are at the heart of all
225
contemporary debates about law and economics at large. The
platform provides new opportunities to continue these debates,
but it does not transform or transcend these hard choices in
any meaningful way.
In 2014, the National Economic Council invited economists
studying the platform, as well as key business and union leaders, to the White House. The agenda was set to think about the
shifts from traditional employment safety nets and new forms
of work in the digital world. These shifting patterns are widespread and not unique to the platform economy. As with the
222. Harry Campbell, Could Dependent Contractors Be the Answer for
Uber?, FORBES (June 19, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrycampbell/
2015/06/19/could-dependent-contractors-be-the-answer-for-uber/#7c9f7dff72d5.
223. Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if
-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831.
224. Id.
225. Peter Ferrara, Fallacies of Economic Inequality that Promote Poverty,
FORBES (July 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2011/07/07/
fallacies-of-economic-equality-that-promote-poverty/#2978d69c5ce2.
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case of lodging platforms, regulators should prefer solutions
that directly address any negative consequences that people or
society may experience from the rise of the platform, rather
than blanket prohibitive solutions that stymie its develop226
ment. There are important legislative proposals designed to
increase security in ways other than job stability. As venture
capitalist Marc Andreessen explains, “Perhaps the single biggest key enabler for the sharing/gig/1099 economy in the US:
227
Affordable Care Act of 2010, aka Obamacare.” Indeed, in
some ways, HealthCare.gov has become a human-resources site
228
for the platform economy.
The deeper questions about the desirability of
commodifying every aspect and minute of one’s life, labor, skill
and energy are more unique to the platform, but are likely unsuitable for legal regulation. Is the platform further destabilizing job security and long-term employment? Is it a cause or a
symptom of the shifting patterns of the labor market? The answer is both. The rise of the platform is partly due to the decline of full-time, long-term jobs and cycles of high rates in unemployment. It also represents a shift in preference, as many
people entering the labor market today prefer flexibility and
control over their work-time. The platform also offers opportunities to profit more directly from one’s labor. Compared to
workers employed through manpower agencies, platform companies allow for a greater share of the pay to go to the worker.
To close with an optimistic perspective, the platform may
also be an opportunity to connect workers to each other and
organize in ways that were not previously available. Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk is an online platform that pays independent
contractors cents per task. Millions of individual providers can
speak directly to each other, compared with before when factory workers had to physically meet at odd hours and picket in
front of their manufacturing plant. Using their online connectivity, its workers have organized a letter-writing campaign to
Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos asking him to “see that Turkers are
not only actual human beings, but people who deserve respect,
229
fair treatment, and open communication.” With the technolo226. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING
WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 47–49 (2008).
227. Marc Andreessen (@pmarca), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:37 AM),
https://www.twitter.com/pmarca/status/521957932720615424.
228. See HEALTHCARE, https://www.healthcare.gov (last visited Oct. 14,
2016).
229. Sarah Kessler, What Does a Union Look Like in the Gig Economy?,
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gy of the platform lowering barriers of entry, it is not impossible to imagine that a critical mass of discontent among providers could lead workers to create co-op versions of companies
230
like Uber and Mechanical Turk. With the energy of creative
cause lawyers, it is possible to envision a transportation platform cooperative which adopts Uber-like technology and is es231
The platform enables “ridiculously
sentially driver-owned.
easy group-forming,” which “matters because the desire to be
part of a group that shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a
basic human instinct that has always been constrained by
232
transaction costs.” Online communities have been able to organize and affect policy in other realms, such as organizing
against SOPA/PIPA. Why not form online communities of platform laborers? One such first initiative is Peers, an organization for platform economy workers and an advocacy group for
the platform economy that provides services to its members,
such as personal-liability protection for homes and replacement
233
cars for drivers. Peers describes itself as a “grassroots organization” with the goal to “mainstream, protect, and grow the
sharing economy,” and it already has over 11,000 members and
234
dozens of corporate partnerships. Other local groups of users
are forming to share advice, think about policy, push risk and
responsibilities back from the individual provider to the plat235
form company, and standardize pricing.
FAST COMPANY (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3042081/what
-does-a-union-look-like-in-the-gig-economy. A Mechanical Turk worker working for Crowdflower launched a class-action lawsuit in 2012, alleging misclassification of employees as independent contractors. First Amended Complaint
FLSA Collective Action and State Law Class Action, Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc.,
No. C 12-5524 CRB, 2012 WL 6913384 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012).
230. Cf. Kessler, supra note 229.
231. See generally JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS (2012) (writing about many aspects of legal work in
the sharing economy).
232. SHIRKY, supra note 226, at 54.
233. Shelby Clark, Our First “Homegrown” Products, by Popular Request:
Homesharing Liability Insurance and Keep Driving, PEERS (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.peers.org/our-first-homegrown-products-by-popular.
234. Tarun Wadhwa, The Sharing Economy Fights Back Against Regulators, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/
2013/09/16/the-sharing-economy-fights-back-against-regulators-with-an
-advocacy-group/#6f66db0e3dc4.
235. See, e.g., Juliet Schor, Risks and Rewards of Cultivating a Sharing
Economy, BRINK (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.brinknews.com/risks-and-rewards
-of-cultivating-a-sharing-economy (mentioning Airbnb as having created a
platform for users to set price floors and share advice).

2016]

LAW OF THE PLATFORM

139

3. The Cloud Economy: Does Aereo Infringe Copyright Law?
In a different field of consumption, media content, the Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that Aereo, a provider of online
streaming technology, was an illegal service operating in viola236
tion of copyright law. While commentators do not regularly
describe the fight for over-the-air content access as part of the
“sharing economy” defined by lodging and transportation apps,
Aereo fits well within the rise of the platform. The new business model in significant part turned on technological innovation to better leverage the longstanding mandate for free local
broadcasting. The technological innovation was a dynamic
sharing of antennas, avoiding the cost of duplicating hardware
from house to house. Aereo provided users access to hardware
to capture broadcast and record content for time-shifting pur237
poses. Over-the-air content is free for individual interception.
If you buy rabbit ear antennas and place them on your rooftop,
you are free to watch any programming broadcast over the air
without cost. Aereo sought to allow individuals to shift from
ownership to access. It developed a bank of tiny antennas in
each city in which it operated, which received local TV broadcast signals, much like old rabbit ears. Every time a subscriber
wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo assigned an individual
antenna to the subscriber. Aereo, viewed through the lens of
the platform, was basically a cloud-based intermediary, enabling people to intercept what they were free to consume directly. The challenge was that, in reality, users who subscribed to
Aereo could intercept the local television package of any city in
which Aereo operated, regardless of the user’s location. This
meant that someone in California could purchase the local TV
package for New York City, no longer intercepting in the same
way that a local clunky rabbit ear would enable without the
intermediary. Aereo’s controls on who could watch a certain
television package were very loose; it required users to check a
box stating, “I live in the designated area,” an affirmation simi238
lar to Airbnb’s warning of hosts to respect local zoning laws.
236. Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2516 (2014).
237. See Jacob Kastrenakes, Aereo Loses to Broadcasters in Supreme Court
Fight for Its Life, THE VERGE (June 25, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/
6/25/5801052/aereo-supreme-court-ruling (obtaining legal copies of shows
shifts the time individuals would otherwise have to spend getting those legal
copies onto services like Aereo).
238. See Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for
-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be-breaking-the-law.html.
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Unsurprisingly then, much like other incumbents challenged by the platform, the broadcasting networks opposed this
new business model and claimed that it violated their rights to
receive transmission fees under the Copyright Act. In 2014, the
Supreme Court ruled against Aereo, finding that Aereo had vio239
lated copyrights held by the networks. The point of contention was whether Aereo’s business model constituted a “public
performance” rather than merely enabling individual view240
ing, and if so, Aereo would be legally required to obtain permission from the copyright owners of any programs it trans241
mits. The court ruled in a six to three decision that Aereo’s
business model was essentially like that of a cable television
provider, publicly performing content, despite the great differ242
ences in technology. Following the decision, the company an243
nounced it would immediately suspend its services. In No244
vember 2014, Aereo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Another
company based on similar technology, FilmOn.com, has faced
245
the same fate.
246
Aereo was put in a no-win situation. The Supreme Court
told Aereo it needed a license as a cable provider in order to
247
help transmit content to end users, yet Aereo was unable to
obtain a compulsory license because it was an Internet provider
248
not regulated by the FCC. Thus, Aereo is a striking example
of a disruptive platform business facing protective regulations,
outdated legal definitions, and strong industry foes. In 2015,
the FCC released a new proposed rule for public comment on

239. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
240. Id. at 2499.
241. Id. at 2500.
242. Id. at 2502–03.
243. Steel, supra note 59.
244. Id.
245. See CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7532(NRB), 2014
WL 3702568 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014).
246. At the bankruptcy sale, TiVo bought Aereo’s customer lists and
trademarks, and are planning on starting a similar service, if the FCC’s new
rule passes. Bill Rosenblatt, TiVo Moves Towards Legal Aereo Offering,
FORBES (May 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billrosenblatt/2015/05/20/
tivo-inches-towards-legal-aereo/#c65fa3952d12. See FCC’s regulation cited
infra note 249.
247. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, No. CV 12-4529 DMG (SHx),
2015 WL 1137593 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015).
248. Todd Shields & Alex Barinka, Aereo Sees Path Forward in FCC Online
Video Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-10-28/help-for-online-video-competition-to-be-considered-at-fcc.
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249

It might be too late for
permitting providers like Aereo.
250
Aereo, but the rule will be impactful as online video services
become more popular.
If an Aereo copycat were to emerge under the new FCC
rules, with a compulsory license, the new company might no
longer need the geographic restrictions. Many viewers who
have moved around enjoy watching the local television programming from their hometown, especially in the areas that
Aereo thrived in, such as live sporting events and live news.
Similar to the way other platform companies customize consumption for active users, Aereo provided these options, changing the nature and the range of options available in the area of
television. Instead of consumers purchasing an enormous cable
package and not watching seventy percent of the channels, and
some of the preferred content is unavailable in their cable zone,
Aereo provided a cheaper and more fine-tuned option. Moreover, Aereo helped to reduce the barriers to entry for small, independent broadcasters, who aired niche television content
that broadcasters and cable companies ignored. These small
broadcasters lacked the infrastructure and equipment to broadcast their channels beyond their locality.
Along with the proposed FCC reforms, post-Aereo, there
seem to be positive developments towards enabling innovation
in this area without the threat of regulatory liability. In 2015, a
California court refused to apply the Aereo decision to Dish
Networks’ “DISH Anywhere” service, which allows users to
251
watch live television on their smartphones or tablets. The
court said that DISH Anywhere is different from Aereo because
Dish has a license to transmit the programming while Aereo
252
did not :
The ultimate function of DISH Anywhere is to transmit programming
that is already legitimately on a user’s in-home hardware to a user’s
Internet-connected mobile device. Relying on external servers and
equipment to ensure that content travels between those devices

249. See Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078 (proposed Jan. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
250. Aereo is now suing the Broadcast companies under antitrust law for
causing Aereo to earn less than they should have at their bankruptcy sale by
saying that Aereo’s technology is only appropriate for violating the law. Hiawatha Bray, Aereo Hits Back at TV Networks in Lawsuit, BOS. GLOBE (Mar.
11, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/03/10/bankrupt-aereo
-attacks-nets-again/vzXYiKCiCeP39VcMd10WHP/story.html.
251. Fox Broad. Co., 2015 WL 1137593.
252. Id. at *11.

142

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:87

properly does not transform that service into a traditional cable com253
pany.

Aereo’s plight illuminates the risk for new platform businesses operating in the shadow of the law. Regulatory politics
often decides the winners and losers in society; in this case, the
founders of Aereo took an entrepreneurial risk and lost, in the
face of massive established industry players resistant to disruption and protected by intellectual property law. Linedrawing in intellectual property law is notoriously hard. Looking ahead, the restrictions placed on platform companies
should be ones that raise consumer welfare, rather than protect
incumbent giants. It is pertinent to note a consensus in the
regulatory literature about the importance of lobbying for determining outcomes, as ambiguity in regulatory language is
often resolved through political influence. Comparing the magnitude of the TV networks, as a Goliath that Aereo could not
overcome, Uber may be viewed as a digital unicorn in its lobby254
ing efforts against the taxi industry, which helps to explain
the differences in outcomes of these regulatory battles.
IV. FROM CODE AS LAW TO PLATFORM AS REGULATION
The key to this shift was the discovery that while we totally distrust
strangers, we totally trust people—significantly more than we trust
255
corporations or governments. –Joel Stein, Time Magazine
Modern digital communications allow sharing to happen across a
global village of consumers and providers, with trust established
through electronic peer reviews. –John Hawksworth, Chief Economist
256
at PwC

A. LAW OF THE HORSE AND LAW OF THE PLATFORM
In a short essay written for a symposium about the law of
cyberspace, Judge Easterbrook began with the statement:
[T]he University of Chicago did not offer a course in “The Law of the
Horse.” [The Dean] did not mean by this that Illinois specializes in
grain rather than livestock. His point, rather, was that “Law and . . .”
253. Id. at *12.
254. Compare Uber Technologies, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets
.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000067336&year=2015 (last visited Oct. 14,
2016) (revealing that Uber Technologies spent $470,000 in 2015 on lobbying),
with Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Assn., OPEN SECRETS, https://www
.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000029343&year=2015 (last visited
Oct. 14, 2016) (revealing that the taxi industry spent $150,000 in 2015 on lobbying).
255. Stein, supra note 18.
256. Carson, supra note 176.
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courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire
law. Instead of offering courses suited to dilettantes, the University of
Chicago offered courses in Law and Economics, and Law and Literature, taught by people who could be appointed to the world’s top economics and literature departments—even win the Nobel Prize in eco257
nomics, as Ronald Coase has done.

For Easterbrook, there was nothing new about regulating
the rising World Wide Web. The same principles that lawmakers have always applied to earlier innovations in industry,
technology, and business throughout history would be applied
to this new space. At the same time, Easterbrook warned that
regulatory errors are a great risk, especially in the face of tech258
nology that is not fully understood and still in formation.
Therefore, he urged policymakers to “not struggle to match an
imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand
259
poorly.”
Regulatory regimes should be understood as interrelated
sets of rules based on the structure of industries, norms, and
social goals. From a “law of the horse” perspective, every new
business transaction is analyzable using standard microeconomics transaction costs principles. For example, Easterbrook may view taxi medallion regulations as a simple case of
guild protectionism, while viewing zoning regulations as plau260
sible responses to externalities. As demonstrated earlier, regulators could view the new puzzles of the platform through the
traditional framework of transaction costs analysis, yet a purely “law of the horse” lens would be incomplete. That is, the developments of the platform cannot be fully captured by analyzing the terms of each deal digitally struck on a platform company, and the subsequent efficiencies created. The platform is
also transforming the meaning of markets and actors in nuanced ways. Moreover, as will be discussed next, the platform
lends itself to unique thinking about the right mix of private
and public regulation.
The distinctiveness of the regulatory questions presented
by the rise of the platform lies in the potential these innovations have for disrupting previously accepted legal categories
and regulatory goals. The interplay of interrelated new models,
257. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207.
258. See id. at 211.
259. Id. at 215.
260. Cf. id. at 208 (arguing for developing sound legal principles first, then
applying those principles to new technology).
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practices, and technology introduced by the platform requires
us to revisit settled legal categories, as well as traditional regulatory solutions, and to create predictable and determined regulations for new environments. In this sense, it is both true that
the platform should be understood in light of basic legal principles that existed before its rise and that, unlike in the case of
horses, there is something new and unique about the law of the
platform. In particular, we have seen that platform business
models have created new hybrids, which regulators must contemplate. Off-on categories such as consumer-business; employee-freelancer; residential-commercial are, in some instances, no longer viable as organizing frameworks. Unique fusions
emerge as technology companies centralize some important aspects of the market transaction like, for example, the methods
of payment, search and review, and information and trust.
Simultaneously, these companies are decentralizing other fundamental aspects of the exchange controlled by users, such as
pricing in the lodging apps and work hours in the transportation and cleaning service apps, aspects which once determined
the supply infrastructure of a business. What this means for
regulators is that, rather than a unified single entity, which
has traditionally been the object of regulation, transactions are
now shaped by multiple actors, with varying capacities, interests, and needs. The easy cases are where old categories and
concepts, such as tax collection, are still applicable to new
business models. The hard cases are those which require policymakers to revisit longstanding legal distinctions and fundamental regulatory goals. The platform economy is therefore a
perfect setting to innovate, not only markets, but also the legal
process.
B. JUST AN APP? PLATFORM IMMUNITY AND THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
In 1996, in the early days of the Internet, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) was enacted to protect providers of an
interactive computer service from civil liability for another’s
actions. The Act holds that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
261
content provider.” An overarching practical question in light
of the shift to Web 3.0 is whether the CDA protects platform
261. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
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business models. The Act provides a legal background against
which Internet platforms like Airbnb can operate with some
degree of legal certainty as to their liability for their users’ actions. Companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb, based on their
self-definition as purely online tech sites, are arguing that they
fall under the definition of the Act, which thereby protects
262
them from civil liability. At the same time, the protection under CDA is limited. Section 230 grants broad immunity to websites with user-generated content, but it does not apply to Internet sites that “materially contribute” in branding or shaping
263
the transaction. Additionally, §230 does not apply to websites
264
that materially contribute to unlawful content. Lastly, §230
protects websites from neither federal criminal violations nor
265
state law violations.
In 1995, a year before Congress passed the CDA, San
Francisco-based programmer Craig Newmark created
Craigslist.org, a website that enables users to post classified
266
ads and interact in forums. Craigslist’s simple design, modest
beginnings, and firm reluctance to selling advertisement space
contributed significantly to its success in more than 450 cities
267
worldwide. To date, Craigslist has avoided every civil charge
raised against it under §230 and recently implemented changes
268
to its website to avoid future liability. However, a recent case
269
demonstrates the limits of §230 immunity. In a lawsuit action
against Roommates.com, a matching site that allows people to
find roommates, the court determined that immunity did not
apply, because Roommates.com acted as an information content
provider when it required website users to complete question-

262. Cf. Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“Section 230, however, plainly immunizes computer service providers like
AOL from liability.”).
263. Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398,
417 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding Dirty World not liable because it did not materially contribute to the tortious content at issue).
264. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012) (mentioning the sexual exploitation of
children and obscenity as unlawful content).
265. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(3) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this
section.”).
266. Shahrzad T. Radbod, Craigslist—A Case for Criminal Liability for
Online Service Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 597, 597 (2010).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 615.
269. See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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270

naires it had created. That is, Roommates.com contributed to
the content users placed on its website. The court elaborated
that §230 did not shield online service providers from civil
claims when they materially contribute to the unlawfulness of
271
the content. The court reasoned that “[t]he Communications
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land
272
on the Internet.”
Under this newer analysis, an interactive platform company may not be as fortunate as Craigslist, but rather is more
closely characterized to Roommates.com, and certainly may be
liable for any illegal behavior if prosecutors bring criminal
charges. There are fine lines separating conduct that would fall
within the exceptions. If the service provider puts branding on
elicited content; supplies the user with tools of the trade, such
as GPS devices or equipment to process transactions; or sets
the pricing and the transactional conditions, then it is unclear
if the service provider is still a pure publisher. Still, the CDA
has largely acted as a liability shield from civil litigation, and it
is likely that, for the most part, platform companies will continue to enjoy at least partial immunity under the Act. As a
consequence of this immunity, local and state agencies may focus some of their regulatory and enforcement powers on the
users of platform services, instead of focusing on the actual
273
companies. This result is problematic and recalls the prosecution of end-users who download music or infringe upon pa274
tents. At the same time, as we shall see in the next Section,
platform companies have taken an active role in creating an
infrastructure that provides grievance mechanisms, insurance
coverage, and compliance controls, which together may operate
as alternatives to traditional law and regulation.
C. SYSTEMS OF STRANGER TRUST
In olden times, villagers built trust through repeated interactions with neighbors. Familiarity, proximity, reciprocity,
continuity, repeat interactions, and immediate accountability
275
in the small community enhanced compliance. Over time, as
270. Id. at 1166.
271. Id. at 1169.
272. Id. at 1164.
273. Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 149, 160–61 (2015).
274. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005).
275. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVO-
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exchanges grew in scale and pace, and as the corporate form
took over, this trust was broken, and regulators stepped in. The
platform is anything but a return to the small-scale community. The platform is characterized by its vast ever-expanding
scale, generated by access and connectivity between strangers.
At the same time, access, scale, repeat interactions, and technological identification combine to create a new system of
stranger-oriented trust. The platform is introducing new forms
of private regulation: reviews, ratings, and social network recommendations. These features can combine to provide alternatives to traditional regulation. Strikingly, the same technological advancements that enable the rise of new business models
also enable forms of dynamic mass monitoring and transparency. The confidence generated by state permitting, occupational
licensing, and other regulatory requirements is substitutable
with crowd confidence.
Web 2.0 marketplace pioneer, eBay, was a leader in creating a “trust and safety” division and, not coincidentally, former
276
eBay insiders led many next generation start-ups. The most
successful new platform companies now offer similar services to
increase user protection and confidence. Airbnb, for example,
recently stepped up its own “trust and safety” unit when it cre277
Airbnb also advises its
ated an around-the-clock hotline.
hosts on best practices, recently holding its first ever conven278
tion with over 1500 of its most productive providers. The
company has taken the lead in proactively engaging in
knowledge sharing, building best practices, disseminating information about hospitality standards and guidelines, and sup279
porting meet-ups for hosts. From a regulatory compliance
standpoint, Airbnb notifies its users about their obligation to

LUTION FOR INSTITUTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (describing conditions for commons).
276. Stein, supra note 18.
277. Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uber
-lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0.
278. Arun Sundararajan, What Airbnb Gets About Culture that Uber
Doesn’t, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 27, 2014), https://www.hbr.org/2014/11/what
-airbnb-gets-about-culture-that-uber-doesnt.
279. Id.; cf. Kara Swisher, Yahoo Loses Government Relations Head to
Airbnb, ALLTHINGS (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.allthingsd.com/20121015/
yahoo-loses-government-relations-head-to-airbnb-internal-memo-time
(discussing Airbnb’s hiring of David Hantman to “help them convince governments that allowing people to rent out their own homes or apartments . . . is
great for the economy”).
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abide by their zoning restrictions, local government laws, and
280
tax regulations. These notifications also come with a caveat:
Airbnb users are warned in the terms and conditions on
Airbnb’s website not to break any laws, but also are required to
release the company from any responsibility for hosts’ compli281
ance with those laws. From a liability standpoint, as will be
discussed in the following Subsection, Airbnb has gradually
upgraded its standard insurance policy, which now covers
282
$1,000,000 for loss or damages.
In a 2015 PwC survey, the majority of respondents reported that they will not fully trust platform businesses until the
questions of their regulation are settled: “[w]hen regulation is
solidified, these business models will be fully legitimized—not
283
just by law, but also in the minds and hearts of consumers.”
The following Sections examine the developments in selfregulation of platform companies, which are often triggered by
local and federal regulations. The Subsections proceed from the
more traditional responses of insurance and background checks
to the newer dynamic feedback systems of ratings and reviews.
1. Insurance
Insurance is the traditional response to regulating risk. After Gawker published a story about a San Francisco woman
whose house was vandalized by Airbnb renters in 2011, Airbnb
284
added a $50,000 host guarantee against vandalism. Airbnb
has since instituted its Host Protection Insurance program,
covering up to $1 million primary liability for third party bodily
285
injury or property damage. Most recently, in October 2015,
the plan expanded to cover claims against landlords and homeowners associations from guests who suffer injury during a
stay, and claims against hosts filed by landlords for damages
286
caused by guests to a building’s property. Airbnb also offers
280. Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms (last visited
Oct. 14, 2016).
281. Id.; Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for
-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be-breaking-the-law.html.
282. Host Protection Insurance, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host
-protection-insurance (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
283. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 36, at 29.
284. Ryan Tate, Sleazy Airbnb Is ‘Very Sorry’ for Wrecking Your Apartment, GAWKER (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.gawker.com/5827043/sleazy-airbnb
-is-very-sorry-for-wrecking-your-apartment.
285. Host Protection Insurance, supra note 282.
286. Id.
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an online Host Protection Resolution Center, a sophisticated
and efficient internal dispute resolution system, which strives
to resolve disputes within one week, far quicker than most pub287
lic and private grievance processes. When a dispute arises
between guests and renters, parties are referred to the Resolu288
tion Center where the parties communicate directly. If the
parties fail to reach an agreement, Airbnb can step in to arbi289
trate the dispute. In addition, a number of Airbnb policies
serve to prevent disputes before they occur by allowing refunds
within twenty-four hours in the event the rented accommoda290
tion is unacceptable.
Uber has similarly instituted a liability policy of $1 million
291
in coverage for each trip. Other platforms similarly offer insurance for their users. For example, Feastly, a culinary platform company, offers insurance when booking a culinary pop292
up event through its app. While leading platform companies
initiated some of these developments, regulators play a role in
directing a platform’s insurance policies. In Colorado, ridesharing companies must offer up to $1 million in liability insurance from the time a driver accepts a request to the moment
293
when the rider leaves the car. California’s law is even more
stringent than that, as starting July 2016, the law will require
ride-sharing companies to provide insurance from the moment
294
a driver turns on the app. Proposed legislation in the state of
Washington, similar to California’s law, would require insur295
ance to be valid as soon as the driver logs into the app. In
Washington D.C., the law requires ride-sharing services to pro287. See What Is the Resolution Center?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/767/what-is-the-resolution-center (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
288. Ethan Katsch & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology and Dispute Systems Design: Lessons from the “Sharing Economy,” 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2015, at 8, 11.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 12.
291. Nairi, Insurance for Ridesharing with Uber, UBER, https://newsroom
.uber.com/insurance-for-uberx-with-ridesharing (last updated July 8, 2016).
292. Anthony Ha, Feastly, A Marketplace for Dining Experiences, Raises
$1.25M, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.techcrunch.com/2014/11/
25/feastly-seed-funding-westly-group.
293. Douglas MacMillan, Uber Laws: A Primer on Ridesharing Regulations, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/29/uber
-laws-a-primer-on-ridesharing-regulations.
294. Id.
295. Victoria Cavaliere, Washington State Lawmakers Consider Statewide
Ridesharing Rules, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us
-usa-washington-ridesharing-idUSKBN0L625420150203.
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vide primary insurance coverage “of at least $1 million per occurrence for accidents” from the time a driver accepts a call un296
til the passenger exits the car. The U.K. government recently
brought insurance leaders together to design good policies for
297
platform business models.
In some cases, regulators have brought action against platform companies that have failed to comply with insurance requirements. RelayRides, a peer-to-peer car rental company, recently received a cease-and-desist letter from New York State’s
Department of Financial Services (DFS), which charged
RelayRides with “false advertising and violations of insurance
298
law.” DFS also issued a “scam alert” because New York insurance law could leave car-sharing users unprotected in the
299
event of an accident. DFS further stated that car-sharing
programs may be in violation of existing insurance policies,
300
which in turn may lead to users losing their coverage. Despite
its continued ban from New York, RelayRides recently rebranded itself under the name “Turo” and has raised funding in
301
excess of $100 million. Turo updated its insurance policy to
ensure it covers all of its travelers with at least the minimum
302
coverage required by the state in which its users are located.
In addition, like Uber drivers, Turo car owners are provided
303
with $1 million of insurance. Turo now operates in over 2500
296. Lori Aratani, D.C. Council Okays Bill To Legalize Lyft, Sidecar,
UberX-Type Services in the District, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/10/28/d-c-council-okays-bill-to
-legalize-lyft-sidecar-uberx-type-services-in-the-district.
297. Carson, supra note 176.
298. Channtal Fleischfresser, Car-Sharing Service RelayRides Halts Service After Cease-and-Desist Letter, ZD NET (May 17, 2013), http://www.zdnet
.com/article/car-sharing-service-relayrides-halts-service-after-cease-and-desist
-letter.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Sean O’Neill, RelayRides Rebrands as Turo, Lands $47M Series C,
TNOOZ (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.tnooz.com/article/relayrides-rebrands-as
-turo-lands-47m-series-c; see also Alex Konrad, With $47 Million and a New
Name, Car-Sharing Startup RelayRides Seeks Rebirth, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2015/11/04/with-47-million-and-a-new
-name-car-sharing-startup-relayrides-seeks-rebirth/#4622dd6b7c7c.
Along
with the name change, Turo shifted gears into a new market that facilitates
peer-to-peer car rentals, which allows users to rent a car that fits their needs
for longer periods of time.
302. Detailed Explanation of Insurance and Protection Provisions, TURO,
https://support.turo.com/hc/en-us/articles/203990610-Detailed-explanation-of
-insurance-and-protection-provisions-renters (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
303. See id.
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cities and in every state except New York, and has recently ex304
panded into Canada.
2. Background Checks
Background checks of providers are another traditional response to risk. All ride-sharing legislation imposes safety regulations that include driver background checks and car inspections. The area of disagreement is how stringent the tests
should be. Colorado, for example, imposes background checks
on Uber drivers that are less stringent than those required of
taxi drivers. In Colorado, taxi drivers are subject to fingerprint
background checks performed by the federal and Colorado bureaus of investigation, while ride-sharing drivers remain vetted
305
by private companies that use publicly available data. In
2014, Illinois legislators passed two bills, supported by the taxi
industry, that require state-conducted background checks for
306
platform drivers. The governor vetoed these bills, and instead
307
signed a less-stringent background check bill in 2015. New
308
and Washington
laws regulating ride-sharing in Virginia
309
D.C. similarly require less-stringent background check requirements. The D.C. law also requires transportation platform
companies to suspend drivers when a customer complains of
drug or alcohol use, or that the driver refused service on the
310
basis of discrimination.
Regardless of state regulation, Uber itself, following media
criticisms about the safety of its service, pre-screens its drivers
in all localities using four separate checks: driving history;
criminal background checks, including checks against the National Sex Offender Registry; vehicle inspections; and medical

304. Why Turo?, TURO, https://www.turo.com/all-cities (last visited Oct. 14,
2016).
305. Andy Vuong, Colorado First To Authorize Lyft and Uber’s Ridesharing
Services, DENVER POST (June 5, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/2014/06/05/
colorado-first-to-authorize-lyft-and-ubers-ridesharing-services.
306. See Ray Long, Quinn Lays Political Traps for Rauner on Way out the
Door, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
politics/chi-quinn-leaves-political-traps-for-rauner-on-way-out-door-20150112
-story.html.
307. Id.
308. Luz Lazo, Uber and Lyft Are Now Legal in Virginia, WASH. POST (Feb.
18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2015/02/18/
uber-and-lyft-are-now-legal-in-virginia.
309. Aratani, supra note 296.
310. MacMillan, supra note 293.
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311

screening. The Uber driver’s car also undergoes testing and
312
Uber sets requirements for auto quality. No Uber vehicle is
allowed to be older than a 2004 model. In the area of home services, TaskRabbit, matching over 30,000 “taskers,” pre-screens
313
and provides background checks for each of its taskers. In
lodging, Airbnb provides digital verification of government IDs
314
of its users.
3. Ratings and Reviews
More revolutionary than either insurance or background
checks is the dynamic rating and recording of each transaction
on the platform. At Uber, a bilateral record of every transaction
is kept: riders rate drivers who rate riders. Safety is inherent in
the design. Companies store each customer’s credit card and
other identifying information in their system. The transactions
are cashless and tip-less to disincentivize theft. The rating system is not only provided to the riders and drivers, but is also
operationalized. Riders or drivers that fall beneath a certain
rating are suspended. Before suspending, Uber also has a consultation process for drops in ratings and, while drivers have
criticized the process for a lack of transparency, Uber promised
to clarify its termination and consultation policies as part of the
315
proposed settlement in O’Connor. All of these combine to incentivize consistently good service and behavior:
[D]rivers have an incentive to provide great service because at the
end of each trip, passengers rate them on a scale of 1–5 (with 5 being
the best). Uber drops drivers with low scores—market incentives tend
to yield better service than the “who else are you going to use” atti316
tude often associated with regulated monopolies such as taxis.
311. See Details on Safety at Uber, UBER (July 15, 2015), https://newsroom
.uber.com/details-on-safety (explaining four separate background checks required in California).
312. Uber Car Requirements, IDWU (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www
.idrivewithuber.com/uber-car-requirements.
313. Are Your Taskers Screened and Background Checked?, TASKRABBIT,
https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411630-Are-your-Taskers
-screened-and-background-checked (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
314. What Is Verified ID?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/
450/what-is-verified-id (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
315. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL
4398271, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016).
316. Rafi Mohammed, Uber’s “Price Gouging” Is the Future of Business,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.hbr.org/2013/12/ubers-price
-gouging-is-the-future-of-business?utm_source=feedburner. Notably, while
reviews are significant for identification of quality service on the platform, it is
also a platform feature that could potentially determine the fate of the entire
industry on the employment law front. The Uber/Lyft lawsuits emphasize the
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At least from initial studies, it appears that these technological safety-by-design systems implemented by platform companies are effective. For example, a recent study conducted by
Zendrive, a company that looks at driving habits using smart
technology, shows that taxi drivers were forty-six percent more
likely to speed than a platform driver, including Uber, Lyft,
and Sidecar, and eight percent more likely than a “nonprofes317
sional” private driver. Taxi drivers were also twenty-six percent more likely than platform drivers to engage in other un318
safe practices such as cellphone use or hard-braking.
Technology allows for a variety of real-time monitoring.
Uber and Lyft allow users to see the GPS path and monitor the
driver-chosen route. These types of systemic controls align incentives on both ends of the deal. All users of the platform,
whether buyers or sellers, host or guest, driver or rider, errand
runner or errand giver, are interested in a successful transaction to maintain high ratings. The identification, review, and
ratings systems in turn create reciprocal trust that is multilayered: trust in participants; in value exchanged; in platform/network. Pre-platform, consumer groups were the watchdog intermediaries of the market, but now watchdogging is
crowdsourced.
In many ways, these new forms of regulation are superior
to traditional ones. Technology creates a record of each transaction, and digital rating systems functionally substitute personal
319
trust and regulated standards. Insurance focuses on liability
when things go wrong. Background checks are backward looking. But ratings systems are real-time and dynamic. They are
relevant, updated, broad, and deep. Every service, product, and
provider is tracked and reviewed for customer satisfaction.
Every customer is also identified, rated, and reviewed. This
creates a true Foucauldian panopticon, or what Eric Goldman
has referred to as the “secondary invisible hand”:

use of ratings to suspend drivers as one of the key indications that drivers are
employees rather than independent contractors. See also Kessler, supra note
17.
317. Ann-Marie Alcantara, Study Finds Taxi Drivers Are the Worst Drivers,
BOLD ITALIC (Dec. 11, 2014), https://thebolditalic.com/study-finds-taxi-drivers
-are-the-worst-drivers-the-bold-italic-san-francisco-fde1c187c055#.6mfg.
318. Id.
319. See Lior Strahlevitz, ‘How’s My Driving?’ for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1759–65 (2006) (explaining how technology
can expand citizen policing to even loose-knit environments).
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When information . . . is costly, reputational information can improve
the operation of the invisible hand by helping consumers make better
decisions [about vendors]. In this case, reputational information acts
like an invisible hand of the invisible hand . . . because reputational
information can guide consumers to make marketplace choices that in
320
aggregate enable the invisible hand.

Above the layer of the reviews of each individual company,
specialized consumer review sites aggregate information and
compare reviews across companies, making such sites more
321
important than advertising. Aggregators include sites like
AlltheRoom, which looks at the various competing lodging platforms and presents information about all availabilities. Such
aggregators ensure competitive price and quality. The most interesting aggregators highlight individual providers who are
active across various platforms. Increasingly, the platform offers layers of reputational certification. AirtaskerPRO, for example, offers background checks and even in-person interviews
for anyone providing platform services. Another example,
Klout, offers a reputational capital tool which aggregates general online influence, e.g., measuring the number of times one’s
322
Facebook posts are viewed. Many of these start-ups seek to
expand the reputational information of their brands to reach
potential new consumers through the use of an application pro323
gram interface (API). APIs allow third-party developers to
integrate the services of another company directly into its application. To illustrate, Uber expanded its API to include eleven
new partners ranging from TripAdvisor and OpenTable to
324
Starbucks and Hyatt Hotels. Now, a user who makes a reser320. Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY:
HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 51, 53 (Hassan
Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2011); see also Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing
Reputation Systems for the Social Web, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW
ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 3, 7 (Hassan Masum
& Mark Tovey eds., 2011) (listing ways to aggregate and display reputation
information); Liangjun You & Riyaz Sikora, Performance of Online Reputation
Mechanisms Under the Influence of Different Types of Biases, 12 INFO. SYS. &
E-BUSINESS MGMT. 417, 418 (2014).
321. See Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMM. ACM 45, 46
(2000) (noting that registered retailers who have profiles in websites such as
bizrate.com foster trust among consumers).
322. Alyson Shontell, How a Guy Who Had His Jaw Wired Shut for 3
Months Used the Experience To Build a $200 Million Startup, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-klout-sold-for-200
-million-2014-3 (explaining the rise of Klout and its founder, Joe Fernandez).
323. Id.
324. Ryan Lawler, Uber Opens Its API with 11 Launch Partners, Including
OpenTable, TripAdvisor, and United Airlines, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 20, 2014),
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vation at a restaurant through the OpenTable app or books a
room through TripAdvisor can request an Uber driver directly
from those third-party apps. Success in the platform economy
often comes down to reaching and retaining more users, and
API utilization exposes potential users to new platforms
through the apps they already use.
Beyond cross-reputational aggregators, platform companies increasingly rely on the overall social capital that each
participant develops online. For example, Airbnb asks users to
provide links to their social media profiles, including Facebook,
Google+, Twitter, and LinkedIn. In essence, ratings are getting
another step up—delinked from one digital service or company,
and creating a multi-layered trust pyramid that becomes richer
325
and thicker over time. Licensing rose as the consumer protection default for quality control. But once the technology is in
place and a critical mass of participants and points of data is
reached, systems of online trust may be more effective than
traditional one-shot regulation.

https://www.techcrunch.com/2014/ 08/20/uber-api-part-deux.
325. See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The Trust Pyramid
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D. DESIGN AROUND REGULATION: ARBITRAGE, CIRCUMVENTION,
LOOPHOLES AND NEGATIVE SPACES
We have seen that definitional defiance is central to the
business model of the platform. At the same time, law is all
about definitions. A fundamental challenge for regulators is
what we might call the notorious GRC, the Goldilocks Regulatory Challenge: getting law just-right with neither definitional
over-inclusiveness nor under-inclusiveness. Inevitably, there
are always loopholes around definitions meant to apply to new
circumstances, resulting in under-inclusive coverage. At the
same time, because of the limits of imagination and the inevitable lag of law behind life, we can expect regulation through
false analogies and the insertion of new circumstances into existing boxes that no longer fit the goals envisioned by their designers, inevitably resulting in over-inclusive coverage.
Different bodies of law have dealt with the Goldilocks Regulatory Challenge in varying ways. First, it is useful to consider
326
the concept of regulatory arbitrage, developed primarily with-

326. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) (explaining the origins and concept of
regulatory arbitrage).
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in scholarship in the context of tax and financial planning.
Regulatory arbitrage is
a perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs. Regulatory
arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the
legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that
327
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.

Regulation imposes costs and if that cost can be reduced,
both sides of the transaction, the buyer and seller or user and
provider, can split the savings. The challenge of sorting out
regulatory avoidance from innovation is at the core of debates
about the regulation of new business models:
When new forms are chosen because they reduce transaction costs,
legal innovation presumptively increases efficiency. But when new
forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase
transaction costs compared to the old structure, we lose twice: efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction costs, and the regula328
tory burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage.

Under regulatory arbitrage, a key to differentiating regulatory avoidance and legitimating innovation is to track “the economic substance of deals in accordance with the policy goals of
329
that regime” as closely as possible. Focusing on the substance
of the deal, we have seen that technology and economic efficiencies have driven the rise of the platform economy. If a platform
company is avoiding costs that are part of the policy goals of a
legal regime, then regulators can step in to extend requirements to the new business model. Still, the economic and social
logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in all
stages of the deal, as well as creating new markets that map
onto new preferences and lifestyles, is the primary raison d’être
of the rise of the platform. Therefore, it is largely the case that
the substance of the deal is to create efficiency not directly
linked to regulatory avoidance.
Another field of law that can offer insight into the definitional defiance dilemma is copyright law. This area of law
grapples directly with technological progress and new economic
models. The “anti-circumvention” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act codified in §1201 of the Copyright Act,
were enacted to stop copyright infringement by preventing

327. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229
(2010).
328. Id. at 275.
329. Id.
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technological advances from defeating anti-piracy protections
330
Proponents of antibuilt into copyrighted works.
circumvention laws have argued that it was necessary to extend existing protections into new forms of consumption and
digitization. Conversely, similar to more recent debates about
regulating the platform, critics of these policy expansions have
argued that the push comes from entrenched business inter331
ests. A central insight from anti-circumvention critics is that
the law overreaches. Regulation through anti-circumvention
332
prevents not only infringement but also fair use. In Aereo, the
architecture of the system was viewed by the dissent in the Second Circuit Court as “over-engineered” and a “Rube Goldberg”
333
model. The Supreme Court later agreed and viewed the technological innovation as designed with the sole purpose of avoiding the black-letter copyright law, or in other words, it equated
334
definitional defiance with regulatory avoidance. The Court
dismissed the argument that the technological differences
made Aereo legal, revealing an anti-circumvention lens under
which the default response for technological change is expan335
sion of the regulatory coverage. A different concept within
intellectual property may better serve policymakers as they
continue to strive for smart regulatory measures, while encouraging innovation and progress. In patent law, unlike the schema of circumvention, which pervades copyright law, the concept of “design around” offers a default approach that views
definitional defiance as positive. Indeed, patent law “has long
recognized the policy justification of inventing around which is

330. 44 Cong. Rec. H7093, H7094-5 (Aug. 4, 1998); Senate Judiciary
Comm., S. Rep. 105-190 (1998) at 29; Judiciary Comm., H. Rep. 105-551 Pt 1
(1998) at 18; House Commerce Comm., H. Rep. 105-551 Pt 2 (1998) at 38.
331. E.g., Unintended Consequences: 15 Years Under the DMCA, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended
-consequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca (giving examples of how DMCA has
enabled businesses and the government to censor and chill research and expression).
332. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 537–57 (1999) (claiming the non-infringing uses of the copyright bill are too narrowly tailored).
333. Adam Liptak, Justices Skeptical of Aereo’s Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/business/media/supreme-court
-hears-arguments-in-aereo-case.html.
334. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503
(2014).
335. Id. at 2508–09.
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sometimes touted as one of the benefits of the patent system.”
Competitors to the patent holder are encouraged to invest their
creativity and resources to finding substitutes to the patented
technology. The concept of design around thus offers a productive lens from which to view innovation: seeking alternative
models to dominant competitors should be assumed to be permissible. Indeed, this shift in the default assumptions of business innovation fits well with a broader shift in contemporary
regulatory theory.
In recent decades, regulation has shifted away from command-and-control to more participatory modes of rule-making,
compliance, and enforcement. If law was once conceptualized as
national, top-down, and sanctioned under the New Deal regulatory model, the beginning of the twenty-first century has
marked a new regulatory paradigm: that of governance.
Against the backdrop of global competition, changing patterns
of production, and a declining commitment to direct legal intervention, policymakers have been experimenting with more participatory and collaborative models of regulation, in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving policy goals. Under this model, platform companies can be
viewed as partners, rather than adversaries, of the legal process. The governance paradigm encourages multiple stakeholders to share traditional roles of governance. Highlighting the
increasing significance of norm-generating nongovernmental
actors, the model promotes a movement downward and outward, transferring responsibilities to states, localities, and the
private sector—including private businesses and nonprofit organizations. Lawmaking shifts to a reflexive approach, which is
process-oriented and tailored to local circumstances. At the
same time, by linking together geographically and materially
dispersed law reform efforts, the model provides innovative
ways to coordinate local efforts and to prevent the isolation of
problems:
Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and
encouraging the replication of success stories from local or private
levels become central goals of government. Legal orchestration is
achieved through interpenetration of policy boundaries, new public/private partnerships, and next-generation policy strategies such as
negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-based

336. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
64, 67 (2014).
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rules, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure regimes,
337
and coordinated information collection.

One of the key principles under the new model of regulation is the principle of permanent learning. Max Weber warned
that
those who continuously participate in the market intercourse with
their own economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of
the market and interest [in the] situation than the legislators and enforcement officers whose interest is only ideal . . . . It is those private
interested parties who are in a position to distort the intended mean338
ing of a legal norm to the point of turning it into its very opposite.

While Weber emphasizes learning capacities of regulated industry, under a new governance framework, smart regulation
339
aids positive evolution of policy and prevents ossification. The
advanced technological capabilities of the platform economy
can be revolutionary in aiding this practice by allowing better
data collection and analysis. The business of regulatory agencies becomes more about regulatory research and development
340
than rule-making and enforcement. With data and research,
we can continue to address the key questions for the law of the
platform: Are new business models presenting an opportunity
of systematic reduction in transaction costs rather than simply
a shift in rents from incumbents to new firms? Are there new
kinds of inequities and systematic market failures in the rise of
the platform? Can some of these failures, such as asymmetric
information, be rectified by the very technology that helps the
transactions? Are there other types of failures, for example externalities of third-party safety or the rise of quasi-monopolies,
that require public regulation? The message of new governance
is to continue engaging these challenges with a data-driven,
multi-stake collaborative framework, experimenting with different solutions to encourage innovation. In other words, we
want to keep the platform weird, diverse, and fair.

337. Lobel, supra note 109, at 345.
338. Max Weber, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 38 (Max Rheinstein
ed., Edward Shils trans., 1954).
339. E.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (listing framework of how to implement
smart regulation).
340. Id. at 31 (“In the collaborative model, the state is in the business of
regulatory research and development.”).
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E. KEEP THE PLATFORM WEIRD BUT EQUITABLE: A DIGITAL
NEW DEAL
Why has the Internet proved to be such a powerful engine for creativity, innovation, and economic growth? . . . A big part of the answer
traces back to one key decision by the Internet’s original architects: to
make the Internet an open system. –FCC Chairman Julius
341
Genachowski

A promising aspect of the contemporary law of the platform
is that many of the regulatory questions of Web 3.0, including
zoning, consumer protection, residential and transportation
safety, worker rights, and occupational licensing, are traditionally resolved at the state and local levels. This decentralization
lends to a productive natural experiment. Local governments
can see the benefits of collaborating and participating in the
platform economy and try different paths toward the policy
goals with which they are charged. The Brandeis dream of laboratories of experimentation, with its contemporary iteration
in new governance theory calling for democratic experimentalism, can be realized at this moment of immense simultaneous
342
innovation across so many industries in so many localities.
For example, cities, as well as private homeowner’s associations, can position themselves on any point of the spectrum
343
ranging from platform-friendly to platform-free.
Notably, first-mover platform companies appear to want
some light regulation as they attempt to shape the regulatory
field. Indeed, the most successful unicorn start-ups quickly become incumbents, and one way to prevent competition is to accept certain regulatory requirements that will prove more burdensome to newcomers. Put differently, similar dynamics of
resistance through the insistence of regulatory barriers of entry, which existed when platform companies first challenged
their offline competitors, are likely to occur in the competition
among platform companies. It is possible that Web 3.0 platform

341. Michael Moyer, Better Broadband: New Regulatory Rules Could
Change the Way Americans Get Online, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/bigger-better-broadband (quoting FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski).
342. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–16 (1998) (arguing that differing
local government policies allow local governments to learn from each other).
343. See, e.g., Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 3, at 931–32 (showing examples of both cities and homeowner associations that have differing Airbnb policies).
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companies will be able to sustain more competition by robust
differentiation of services, as opposed to previous generations of
search (Google), social media (Facebook), and retail (Amazon),
which have emerged as quasi-monopolies.
Still, first-mover advantage is key, especially with a business model that relies on scale of user network for effective
supply and demand. As the nature of platform companies continues to evolve, it is likely that, as some of these dominant
first-mover companies transition from upstarts to the “establishment,” new opportunities for disruption will emerge. This
has been the trajectory of many Web 2.0 companies, such as
eBay and Amazon, which started as a collection of individual
sellers and small sellers and quickly shifted to include mainstream retail operations. The platform is similarly transforming in some parts. At Airbnb, many homes are now listed by
professional property managers, which lead private users to
voice concerns that raising the standards and requirements
from hosts will deter casual hosts from this leading platform
344
company. Similarly, Uber drivers are now frequently not
simply private individual users, but rather drivers hired by
345
small businesses operating small fleets of cars. There are recent indications that precisely because of reliance of scale efficiencies, the transportation platform operates under “winner
takes all” conditions, where only a few survive and the rest fall
346
out of the race.
Thus, the platform economy offers us the important insight
that business models continuously change. Business identity
shifts from upstart to establishment and with it the interests of
stakeholders, with regard to regulatory requirements, shift as
well. Moreover, traditional offline competitors are likely to look
increasingly like new platform companies as a result of fruitful
disruption of their established long-standing practices. As one
344. Drew Fitzgerald, Airbnb Moves into Professional Vacation Rentals,
WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-signals
-expansion-into-professional-vacation-rentals-1432051843 (stating that professional vacation home owners may now use Airbnb with ease.
345. Lucy Battersby, Uber Attracts More Carless Drivers as Entrepreneurs
Buy up Ride-Share Fleets, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 23, 2016), http://
www.smh.com.au/business/innovation/uber-cars-used-all-day-and-night-as
-drivers-take-turns-using-cars-20160419-goa0ip.html.
346. E.g., Allen Griswold, Uber Competitor Sidecar Is Shutting Down,
QUARTZ (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.qz.com/583498/uber-competitor-sidecar-is
-shutting-down (stating that Sidecar, the third largest company in the transportation platform after Uber and Lyft, announced in early 2016 that it will
cease operations due to “significant capital disadvantage”).
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analyst commented with Internet startups and established
businesses, “the worlds are actually converging in both direc347
The platform will gradually seek new avenues to
tions.”
commercialize offline and established pre-platform industries
will inevitably venture to electronic services.
Most importantly, to understand the continuous evolvement of the platform, analysts require data and sustained research. With their technological sophistication and foresight,
platform companies have taken a leading role in presenting information about their own social and economic effects. They
have introduced studies that suggest positive effects of the plat348
form on emissions, tourism, and the labor market. These
studies are useful, but not without the danger that they are
directed, or at least funded, by the interested parties themselves, in large part as a way to convince legislatures and regulators, alongside the public, to support their growth. Under new
governance theory, as new business models are introduced,
regulatory agencies should view themselves not merely as reac349
tive enforcers, but also as active researchers of these changes.
Equity issues should continue to be examined with the expansion of the platform. As we have seen, the platform, through
its access and decentralization of supply, can have a tremendous positive impact for individuals who wish to capitalize on
their previously un-monetized talents and abilities. A key question for policy will continue to be whether platform companies
are serving the poor and underserved. Some evidence of disparities and inequality is beginning to emerge with regard to certain services. Both Uber and Lyft are currently facing litigation
in multiple states under the Americans with Disabilities Act
350
(ADA). In one case, an Uber driver allegedly placed a disabled
passenger’s service dog in the trunk, while other drivers are
351
alleged to have sped past riders waiting in wheelchairs. As
347. Emily Steel, Netflix, Amazon and Hulu No Longer Find Themselves
Upstarts in Online Streaming, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/business/media/netflix-amazon-and-hulu-no-longer
-find-themselves-tvs-upstarts.html?_r=0.
348. Cannon & Summers, supra note 21 (suggesting sharing economies
should be proactive with regulators and demonstrate their positive effects).
349. Lobel, supra note 109, at 395–96; see also Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 558 (2000).
350. Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disabilities Laws Don’t Apply to Us, DAILY
BEAST (May 21, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber
-disability-laws-don-t-apply-to-us.html (stating Uber has had disability related
law suits in three states).
351. Jen Wieczner, Why the Disabled Are Suing Uber and Lyft, TIME (May
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with its employment disputes, in these cases Uber argues that,
because it is a technology company and not a transportation
352
company, it does not fall under the purview of the ADA. Uber
claims it cannot control the actions of its drivers who refuse to
accept passengers with disabilities because the drivers are independent contractors, and thus, Uber has no legal obligation
to ensure they comply with the ADA. However, in April the
judge denied Uber’s motion to dismiss, finding that more factual development was needed before the court could rule on
Uber’s qualifications as a “specified public transportation service,” and whether it would, as a result, be liable under the
353
ADA. Uber, possibly in response to pending litigation, recently launched its UberASSIST service to provide senior citizens
354
and people with disabilities with specially trained drivers.
Discrimination may also pervade renting of homes through
Airbnb, but the company has been making a visible effort to
355
send a clear message of zero tolerance. A new study conducted by researchers at Harvard Business School found that requests from guests with distinctively African American names
are sixteen percent less likely to be accepted than identical
356
guests with distinctively white names. These differences persisted whether the host was male or female, African American
or white. To reduce discrimination, the authors of the study
suggest that Airbnb, like traditional hotel chains, should require hosts to accept guests without revealing the guest’s name
357
first. However, when Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky announced
Airbnb’s Verified Identification program in 2013, he stated that
“[a]ccess is built on trust, and trust is built on transparency.
When you remove anonymity, it brings out the best in people

22, 2015), http://www.time.com/3895021/why-the-disabled-are-suing-uber-and
-lyft.
352. Id.
353. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 12, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-04086-NC (N.D. Cal. Sept 09, 2014), ECF
No. 37.
354. See Strochilic, supra note 350.
355. Mike McPhate, Discrimination by Airbnb Hosts Is Widespread, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/
business/discrimination-by-airbnb-hosts-is-widespread-report-says.html (quoting Airbnb’s statement that says they are open to new ideas to combat host
discrimination).
356. Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
16-069, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701902.
357. Id. at 19.
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. . . . We believe anonymity has no place in the future of Airbnb
358
or the sharing economy.”
These emerging challenges of equity and identity on the
platform reveal the inevitable points of tension that policymakers have always faced. Balancing equality and anonymity, inclusion and credibility, and safety and privacy is not a new legal challenge. At the same time, the platform presents new opportunities for monitoring and compliance in order to reach a
desirable delicate balance. Technology-based monitoring can
detect misbehavior in more accurate and fine-tuned ways than
broad-brush rules that risk stifling experimentation and
growth. As private entities, platform companies can respond
swiftly and strongly to incidences of discrimination. Airbnb’s
anti-discrimination policy informs hosts about compliance with
federal and local laws, such as the Fair Housing Act and the
359
ADA. Airbnb asserts that it “respond[s] quickly to any concerns raised by hosts or guests, and [has] a zero-tolerance poli360
cy for discrimination on [its] platform.” In April 2015, Airbnb
removed a Texas bed and breakfast from its listings after its
361
host reportedly discriminated against a gay couple. Airbnb
refunded the money paid for the booking and paid for a night at
362
the hotel that the couple ultimately stayed in. The company
also issued a statement condemning the incident: “AirBNB has
clear guidelines that a host or a guest may not promote hate or
363
bigotry.” Following this model, transportation platform companies could also do more with regard to anti-discrimination
detection and enforcement. One of the great advantages of platform companies’ self-regulation of such issues is the very low
costs involved in looking at the data digitally presented and
reacting forcefully against misconduct by disconnecting a driver
from the app.
358. McPhate, supra note 355.
359. See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to Inclusion
and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1405/airbnb-s
-nondiscrimination-policy--our-commitment-to-inclusion-and-respect?topic=
533 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
360. Rebecca Greenfield, Study Finds Racial Discrimination by Airbnb
Hosts, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-12-10/study-finds-racial-discrimination-by-airbnb-hosts.
361. Curtis M. Wong, Airbnb Removes Texas Property Listing After Owner
Reportedly Rejects Gay Couple, HUFFINGTON POST (May 1, 2015), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/30/airbnb-gay-couple-discrimination-_n_7183806
.html.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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At the same time, there are types of equity issues that may
be harder to deal with. While the mutual rating and review
systems widely adopted on the platform have positive implications for trust and credibility, rating systems may also be affected by biases informed by attitudes on race, sexual orienta364
tion, or disability. Because services like Uber generally contain a photo of the rider, drivers can easily dismiss passengers
of color or those requesting service to a poorer neighborhood for
non-minority passengers seeking a more upscale destination.
Here again, large-scale systematic data analysis, drawing on
the growing technological sophistication of the platform, is key.
Large-scale data can help inform policymakers about patterns
of discrimination better than the inevitable arbitrariness in365
herent in case-by-case discrimination litigation. As with the
other regulatory questions analyzed above, regulators could
potentially require platform providers to disclose such data and
assist with its analysis.
CONCLUSION
The platform economy has incredible potential upsides, but
its rise will continue to leave a wake of disruptive effects that
are not unambiguously positive. When we fundamentally alter
the way that we interact with others, we create new possibilities for efficiency and for achieving social goals. At the same
time, we face the possibility that market innovation undermines existing policy choices as well as introduces new avenues
for abuse. A deep understanding of the dynamics of the platform economy, its logic, and the efficiencies it creates, can better guide policymakers through the vast range of legal fields
and legal categories currently unsettled. An ongoing study of
the nature and effects of the rise of the platform will better inform the law in the continuous search for the optimal balance
between innovation and regulation.

364. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIA85, 95 (2015) (explaining how implicit and explicit biases affect user
ratings).
365. See Lobel, supra note 109; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462–64
(2001) (arguing that a new framework is needed to combat implicit biases and
lays out new framework).
LOGUE

